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INTRODUCTION
As a quintessential civil rights issue, the struggle for equal educational
opportunity for students with disabilities whose families have few
resources is waged daily from the parapets of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),2 a complex entitlement statute.
Dissimilar to the progress made under the IDEA for their wealthier peers,
low-income3 children are not reaping the educational benefits that effective
advocacy has achieved for students with disabilities who can afford
determined advocates, skilled counsel, and knowledgeable experts to
navigate the highly technical mandates of the statute and corresponding
2. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82 (2006) (noting the Act was amended in
2004, after long debate and substantial changes). While consciously dubbed the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act or IDEIA, it continues, with
congressional approbation, to be popularly known as IDEA. Id. § 1400(a).
3. See COLIN ONG-DEAN, DISTINGUISHING DISABILITY: PARENTS, PRIVILEGE, AND
SPECIAL EDUCATION 5 (2009); David C. Vladeck, In Re Arons: The Plight of the
“Unrich” in Obtaining Legal Services, in LEGAL ETHICS STORIES 260 (Deborah L.
Rhode & David Luban eds., 2006) (explaining that neither “low income” nor “poor”
capture the socio-economic status of these families perhaps as well as “privileged” or
“unrich”).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474200

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2474200

HYMAN 10/13/11

110

12/8/201112:33:54 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:1

regulations.4 Among others, these benefits include identification and
certification under the IDEA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
(Section 504);5 development of an enforceable Individualized Education
Program (IEP),6 with a continuum of services calibrated to the precise
needs of each eligible child; rich compensatory services for the failure of
school systems to comply with the requirements of a Free Appropriate
Public Education (FAPE);7 the provision of a focused private education, in
a residential setting if appropriate; protections from school discipline,
including continuing educational services following more than ten days of
out-of-school suspension, and the formulation of a staged transition plan to
ensure meaningful opportunities upon a student’s departure from the school
system.8
The data is mounting to support the thesis that students from families
without resources are systematically deprived of educational outcomes that
would allow them to pursue gainful employment or further educational
opportunities.9 The links between poverty, race, and disability are “welldocumented.”10 Low-income students with disabilities are more frequently
pushed out of public education through punitive discipline, sheer neglect,
or other more subtle strategies.11 Low-income students of color with

61.

4. See generally COLIN ONG-DEAN, supra note 3; Vladeck, supra note 3, at 258-

5. See generally § 1400 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 794.
6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14) (explaining that an Individualized Education
Program, or IEP, is “a written statement for each child with a disability that is
developed, reviewed, and revised” subject to the conditions section 1414(d)).
7. See id. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (2011); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 3041 (1982) (noting that FAPE is the cornerstone of the IEP. FAPE is defined as
special education and related services that: (A) have been provided at public expense,
under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of
the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school,
or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in
conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d));
see also Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985)
(explaining how the failure to provide FAPE gives rise to a claim for compensatory
education or services and that although this remedy was not found in the statute itself,
it was judicially constructed under the theory of tuition reimbursement).
8. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(34)(c) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.43 (2006).
9. See generally Thomas Hehir & Sue Gamm, Special Education: From Legalism
to Collaboration, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 205, 229 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1998) (discussing suspicion of
special education system by parents of children who could benefit from such
opportunities, but do not).
10. See id. (describing specific studies that outline the differential rates of special
education).
11. See Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Discrimination in Our Public
Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inadequate Special Education Services
for Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 447-48 (2001); Dean Hill
Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform: Litigating School Exclusion, 75 TENN.
L. REV. 265, 272-76 (2008).
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unidentified educational disabilities are disproportionately referred for
prosecution in juvenile court.12 If scrupulously observed by school
systems, and rigorously enforced, the IDEA has the power to stem this
phenomenon.13 The paucity of lawyers and advocates who toil to represent
disempowered families and children in special education matters keenly
know that the unmet legal needs in this arena are prodigious, and the
remedies for this often invisible segment of children are elusive. In this
unequal netherworld, can an entitlement statute such as the IDEA
accomplish more for the very children who need the IDEA’s educational
services the most?
The obstacles that families without resources face in the IDEA are
compounded by the increasingly technical nature of the IDEA and the
inability of these families to retain professionals to assist in navigating the
intricacies of disability definitions, evaluation processes, the development
of IEPs, the complex of procedural safeguards, among other provisions in
the statute.14 Lack of access to attorneys vastly worsens this plight.15 This
Article does not diminish the power of some parents, of whatever means,
compellingly to articulate the needs of their children and to advocate for
appropriate services and supports. This is a democratizing feature of the
IDEA that will and should persist. But in the current landscape of
retrenchment—at the school system level, in Congress, and in the courts—

12. See Mark McWilliams & Mark P. Fancher, Undiagnosed Students With
Disabilities Trapped In The School-To-Prison Pipeline, 89 MICH. B.J. 28, 30 (2010)
(recognizing that when students leave education programs they often wind up in the
slippery pipeline towards prison); see also DANIEL P. MEARS & LAUDAN Y. ARON,
URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF YOUTH WITH
DISABILITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CURRENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ii
(2003),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410885_youth_with_disabilities.pdf.
13. See generally NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO SCHOOL ON CIVIL
RIGHTS: ADVANCING THE FEDERAL COMMITMENT TO LEAVE NO CHILD BEHIND 57
REP.
2000],
available
at
(2000)
[hereinafter
NCD
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2000/Jan252000 (addressing a letter to the President
outlining NCD’s independent analyses); CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TOPRISON-PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 55-56 (2010) (describing the policies
and practices that create the “pipeline” with many entry points, including underresourced schools).
14. Compare David Neal & David Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered:
The Case of Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1985) (discussing
how legalization shaped special education policy and the effects of legalization on the
institutions into which it is introduced), with Hehir & Gamm, supra note 9, and Perry
A. Zirkel, The Over-Legalization of Special Education, 195 ED. LAW REP. 35 (2005)
(arguing that it is beyond the scope of the article to debate whether the claim that the
IDEA has “over-legalized” special education is valid or not).
15. See generally Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (stating that lawyers on the
frontline of representing at-risk children in IDEA disputes value the rights-based rules
and regulations embodied in the IDEA, and that a deregulated, less legalistic regime
could herald a return to the era when schools possessed unchecked discretion, which
operated to the profound detriment of students with disabilities).
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the more “smart” corrections that advocates and lawyers can formulate, the
greater the likelihood that at least some will be adopted when the IDEA is
up for its next reauthorization, or enlightened states, through legislation,
regulations, or adoption of best practices, will seek to level the unequal
playing field that this Article traverses.
This Article will (1) focus on the most salient architectural features of
the IDEA that are theoretically designed to protect and assert the rights of
all affected children and parents; (2) analyze how these features
disproportionately fail children from families without financial resources;
and (3) make modest suggestions for improvements to the legal regime
under the IDEA. The full agenda for legislative or court adoption that is
proposed in this Article may seem infeasible at this time. But just as the
pendulum dramatically swung in 1975 when the IDEA was first enacted,
there is hope that, given the country’s increasing focus on improving
educational outcomes for all children, humanitarian impulses will
inevitably rise again and recognize that all students with disabilities—
regardless of their financial status—are entitled to the full benefits of this
remarkable remedial law.16
I. THE UNEQUAL DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE IDEA
There are almost seven million children receiving special education
services under the IDEA.17 Most of these children come from families with
limited resources that do not have access to legal services.18 Of all the
disabled children eligible for special education services under the IDEA,
one-quarter (approximately 2 million) live below the poverty line and twothirds (approximately 4.5 million) live in households with incomes of
16. Our ambition is limited. A full-scale re-evaluation of the entire IDEA and, for
example, its relationships to important national initiatives such as No Child Left
Behind (NCLB), is beyond the scope of this piece.
17. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Special Educ. Programs, Data Analysis Sys.
(DANS), OMB # 1820-0043: Children with Disabilities Receiving Special Education
Under Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Table 1-1: Children
and students served under IDEA, Part B, by age, group, and state: Fall 2008, Table 81: Number of infants and toddlers, ages birth through 2 and 3 and older, and
percentage of population, receiving early intervention services under IDEA, Part C, by
age and state: Fall 2008 (data updated as of Aug. 3, 2009) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., Tables], available at https://www.ideadata.org/arc_toc10.asp (describing the
most recent count of students available from 2008, which shows that 6,941,838
children are served through Parts B and C of the IDEA). The breakdown is as follows:
342,985 children from birth through age two receive early intervention services,
709,004 children between the ages of three and five receive preschool services, and
5,889,849 children between the ages of six and twenty-one receive school-age special
education services. Id.
18. See generally Brief for Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (No. 05-983), 2006 WL 37403678 (discussing a
family, despite being unable to afford an attorney, that nevertheless was able to raise
IEP challenges on behalf of their child).
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$50,000 or less.19 Almost 20% of children receiving special education
services are living in households with a yearly income of $15,000 or less,
compared to 12.5% in general education households; and 36% of children
receiving special education services live in households with an income of
$25,000 or less, compared with 24% of children in the general population.20
School systems, moreover, spend disproportionate sums on private school
tuition, which predominantly benefits families with the means to hire a
lawyer and litigate when necessary.21
Access to attorneys in the special education realm is relatively rare.22
This reality is consistent with recent studies documenting the unmet legal
needs of Americans.23 A recent study by the American Bar Association
found that 60 to 70% of all Americans cannot afford lawyers to meet their
non-routine legal needs.24 For the poorest parents, legal services are simply
not affordable, and limited resources restrict free legal aid to a fortunate
few.25
Under the IDEA, due process hearings and mediation are underutilized
and are used mostly by wealthy families with financial means for a private
school funding remedy. This phenomenon largely explains the increase in

19. See generally MARY WAGNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CHILDREN WE
SERVE: THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS 29 (2002), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED475794.pdf.
20. See NAT’L DISSEMINATION CTR. FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES, WHO ARE
THE CHILDREN RECEIVING SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES 6 (2003), available at
http://nichcy.org/wp-content/uploads/docs/rb2.pdf.
21. See Emily Blumberg, Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 163, 164 (2010) (discussing that although the decision in Forest Grove School
District v. T.A. strengthens IDEA, it does not improve special education provided to
low income students); Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special
Education, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172-73 (2004-05) (emphasizing the
uneven distribution of special education services); Juan Gonzalez, Education
Department’s Special-Ed Help Mostly Goes to the City’s Rich, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec.
15,
2010,
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-12-15/local/27084320_1_specialeducation-pupils-private-school-tuition (stating that $140 million is spent in New York
City on private school tuition).
22. See generally COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES,
http://www.copaa.org (last visited June 17, 2011) (stating that the national special
education bar is small, largely composed of solo practitioners, small firms, legal
services and nonprofit firms, and a handful of pro bono lawyers from large law firms).
The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) serves as a clearinghouse of
assistance to this specialized bar. Id.
23. See M. Brendhan Flynn, In Defense of Maroni: Why Parents Should be
Allowed to Proceed Pro Se in IDEA Cases, 80 IND. L.J. 881, 892 (2005) (emphasizing
that parents should be allowed to proceed pro se to enforce both procedural violations
and substantive claims).
24. Vladeck, supra note 3, at 259.
25. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 4 (2005), available
at http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf.
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the number of special education court decisions.26 As can be expected
families with attorneys prevail more frequently in due process hearings
than those who proceed pro se.27 The canard that IDEA litigation in federal
courts is over-utilized by families has been refuted by a recent empirical
analysis of federal court filings, which found that, relative to the number of
due process filings,28 there is little IDEA litigation in the federal courts, and
the courts’ role in implementing the statute has been notably constrained.29
The IDEA’s remedial scheme and procedural provisions are also
designed to operate in a system where there is overall compliance with the
statutory scheme. Many states, however, are not in compliance with the
IDEA.30 The Department of Education recently determined that only
twenty-eight states were found to have met the IDEA compliance
standards.31
When a district is out of compliance with the statute, many of the
provisions designed to protect parents’ and children’s rights are not
effective because the procedural protections and due process provisions
presume compliance.32 For example, the IDEA presumes that children are
26. See generally Christina Samuels, Special Education Court Decisions on the
WEEK
(Jan.
28,
2011,
9:24
AM),
Rise,
EDUC.
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/2011/01/special_education_court_decisi.html
(interviewing Perry A. Zirkel about his forthcoming article in the West Education Law
Reporter and stating that from 2000 to 2010 there were approximately 8,000 reported
IDEA decisions in both state and federal courts).
27. See MELANIE ARCHER, ACCESS AND EQUITY IN THE DUE PROCESS SYSTEM:
ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND HEARING OUTCOMES IN ILLINOIS, 1997-2002 7-9
(2002), available at http://www.dueprocessillinois.org/Access.pdf (discussing how
attorney representation in due process hearings increases parents’ chances of prevailing
equal to that of school districts); Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing
Systems Under the IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. Disability Pol’y Stud. 3 (2010)
(discussing that between 2000 and 2010, 65% of due process hearings were won by
school districts).
28. Zirkel & Scala, supra note 27, at 4-6 (2010) (providing that during 2008-09
there were 2,033 adjudicated due process hearings, with four states—New York,
California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania—and the District of Columbia accounting
for 85% of these cases and noting that the number of adjudicated due process hearings
decreased in the last decade).
29. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Judiciary’s Now-Limited Role in Special
Education, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION, 121, 122 (Joshua M. Dunn & Marvin R. West eds., 2009)
[hereinafter Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role] (arguing that courts have made “little direct
difference in the treatment of students with disabilities”).
30. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DETERMINATION LETTERS ON STATE
IMPLEMENTATION OF IDEA 1 (2009) [hereinafter DEP’T OF EDUC. IMPLEMENTATION
LETTERS], available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/monitor/factsheet2009.pdf (outlining states’ performances in fulfilling the IDEA’s mandates).
31. See id. at 2 (noting which states require further assistance to comply with the
IDEA).
32. See Margaret M. Wakelin, Comment, Challenging Disparities in Special
Education: Moving Parents from Disempowered Team Members to Ardent Advocates,
3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 263, 263-64 (2008) (describing the failure of enforcement on
federal and state levels).
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thoroughly and accurately evaluated in every area of suspected disability in
a non-discriminatory fashion, and that the professionals conducting the
evaluations will not have their hands tied by restrictions on what can be
recommended.33 Instead, in some districts, children do not receive
thorough and adequate evaluations, and district employees are bound by
blanket policies and even moratoria.34 Thus, the entire process breaks
down.35 Poor families suffer most from this phenomenon.36
II. EQUITABLE AND STATUTORY IDEA REMEDIES HAVE LIMITED
EFFICACY FOR FAMILIES WITHOUT FINANCIAL RESOURCES
A. Overview of the IDEA
1. The Basic Requirements as Envisioned in 1975: A Free and Appropriate
Public Education
A complete discussion of the IDEA is beyond the scope of this Article.
The following overview, however, sets the context for a discussion of
violations and remedies that are at the heart of this undertaking’s critique.
The IDEA, first enacted as the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act (EAHCA),37 was originally adopted to rectify deficiencies in the
educational opportunities afforded to students with disabilities.38 Congress
recognized that without federal pressure school districts frequently did not
serve disabled children properly, but instead excluded them from school,
warehoused them in segregated special education classes, or left them in
regular classes with no services to ensure that they could learn.39 The
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)-(d) (2006).
34. See McWilliams & Fancher, supra note 12, at 30 (discussing the failure of
school systems to comply with their obligation to identify all children with potential
educational disabilities, called “Child Find” under IDEA). The restrictions referred to
in the text are well-known to special education lawyers through member-restricted
listservs.
35. See generally Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External
Advocacy in Special Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802 (2008) (providing a keen analysis
of why the intended system under IDEA fails in its promise).
36. See Caruso, supra note 21, at 178-79 (explaining that disempowered families,
who do not possess the “bargaining power” of families with access to resources, fare
worse under the IDEA).
37. See generally The Education for all Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. 94-142,
89 Stat. 77 (1975). Fifteen years after the EACHA became law, the Act was amended
and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991 and
for purposes of this Article, all references are to IDEA. See Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. 102-119, 105 Stat. 587
(1991).
38. See Jeffrey J. Zettel, PUBLIC LAW 94-142 THE EDUCATION FOR ALL
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL LAW 4-5 (1977),
available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED140554.pdf.
39. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 606 (1988) (ruling that districts cannot
remove a child for more than ten days without making a determination whether the
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statute offered funding to states, in exchange for the provision of special
education services in compliance with the statute’s provisions.40
Throughout the years, this law was reauthorized, with eight name
changes. The current version of the statute was adopted in 2004.41 Each
time the IDEA was reauthorized, the Department of Education promulgated
regulations offering explanatory guidance to the states. Additionally, the
statute requires states and districts to adopt laws, regulations, policies, and
procedures consistent with the IDEA.42 Although the Department of
Education, in theory, has the ability to ensure IDEA enforcement through
withholding of funding, the Department generally takes a hands-off
approach, despite the fact that many states and districts across the country
are significantly out of compliance with the law.43
The primary purpose of the IDEA is to ensure that every child with a
disability, who is therefore eligible for special education services under the
statute, receives a FAPE, regardless of whether the student is in a public or
private school, out of school, homeless, or in a hospital, jail, prison, or
foster care placement. There is no setting, location, or situation, except for
parent refusal, that justifies an eligible child being denied a FAPE. The
IDEA stipulates that students may be entitled to special education services
until age twenty-one.44
With an obligation to provide FAPE to all eligible children, every school
district is mandated to engage in a process known as “Child Find,” which
requires the district to identify, locate, and evaluate all children with
disabilities, regardless of the severity of their disabilities, who are in need
of special education and related services.45 Because the Child Find
obligation is an affirmative one, IDEA does not require parents to request
that the district evaluate their children.46 This duty is triggered when the
district “has reason to suspect a disability, and reason to suspect that special
education services may be needed to address that disability.”47
behavior constitutes a manifestation of the child’s disability).
40. See id. at 597; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1416(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II) (2006) (mandating that
each state must submit a plan to the United States Department of Education
establishing compliance with the IDEA’s provisions upon which funding is approved).
41. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82.
42. Id. § 1415(a).
43. See, e.g., DEP’T OF EDUC. IMPLEMENTATION LETTERS, supra note 30, at 2
(acknowledging the individual states that are not meeting the IDEA’s mandates and
that require assistance and intervention under the IDEA program).
44. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
45. § 1412(a)(3).
46. See Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (“School districts may not ignore disabled students’ needs, nor may they await
parental demands before providing special instruction.”).
47. See Dep’t of Educ. v. Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Haw. 2001)
(emphasis added); see also Reg’l Sch. Dist. No. 9 Bd. of Educ. v. Mr. & Mrs. M. ex
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States and districts must also develop a “continuum” of special education
placements, which include delivery of instruction in regular classes, special
classes, home, and hospital settings.48 All students are entitled to FAPE in
the Least Restrictive Environment (LRE). Under the IDEA, this means that
children with disabilities should, to the maximum extent practicable, be
educated with children who are not disabled.49 Once a child is suspected of
having a disability, the next step is a referral to the school district for a
comprehensive evaluation to assess the child in every area of suspected
disability.50
After the evaluation, a team of professionals and the parent must meet to
determine whether the child is eligible for special education services.51 To
be eligible, children must fit into one of eleven disabling conditions52 and
require special education to receive a FAPE and to ensure their rights are
protected.53
If a child is deemed eligible for special education services, an IEP must
be developed.54 The IEP is a “blueprint” for the delivery of services.55 It
must be created by the a multidisciplinary team with several required
rel. M.M., No. 3:07-CV-01484 (WWE), 2009 WL 2514064, at *12 (D. Conn. Aug. 7,
2009) (holding that the student’s hospital stay was a clear sign of a disability that was
overlooked by the school); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R. ex rel. C., 567 F.
Supp. 2d 918, 950-51 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that the student’s repeated failure to
progress with the section 504 accommodations provided triggered the “child find”
obligation to refer the student to special education services; moreover, the student
failing the standardized test along with having difficulties in reading, math, and science
were clear signals that an evaluation was necessary); Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v.
C.K. ex rel. C., No. 3:07-0826, 2009 WL 499386, at *18 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 27, 2009)
(quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(c)(1) (2007)) (affirming the holding that FAPE was not
provided merely because the child managed to earn average grades and passed to the
next grade and that the school “has clearly misapplied or ignored [the regulation]”);
Scott v. District of Columbia, No. Civ. A. 03-1672 DAR, 2006 WL 1102839, at *9
(D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2006) (declaring that the “child find” obligation is triggered where
teachers knew of the student’s ADHD diagnosis as well as the student’s inability to
“stay on task academically and complete his assignments”).
48. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(i).
49. See § 1412(a)(5)(A) (stating that under the LRE standard, disabled children
should only be educated separately from non-disabled children in circumstances where
the child’s disability is of such severity that education with his or her non-disabled
peers cannot be achieved satisfactorily).
50. § 1414(a)(1)(A)-(B), (D). This referral can be made by a school staff member,
parent, doctor, or judge. 34 C.F.R. § 300.527 (2011).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4)(A).
52. See id. § 1401(3)(A) (listing the IDEA qualifying disabling conditions as: (1)
intellectual disabilities, (2) hearing impairments, (3) speech or language impairments,
(4) visual impairments, (5) serious emotional disturbance, (6) orthopedic impairments,
(7) autism, (8) traumatic brain injury, (9) other health impairments, (10) specific
learning disabilities, and (11) children who need special education and related
services).
53. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B).
54. § 1414(d)(2)(A).
55. § 1414(d)(1)(A).
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members, including the parent, the child’s special education teacher, a
general education teacher, an individual who can interpret the instructional
implications of the assessments, and the child (if appropriate).56 The IEP
must contain, among other things, a statement of the child’s present levels
of academic achievement and functional performance, measurable annual
goals, a description of the metrics to be used to measure whether the child
is achieving his or her annual goals, and an explanation of the extent to
which the child will not be participating in regular classes with nondisabled children.57 The IEP must also set forth all of the special education
services, related services and supplementary aids and supports the child is
to receive.58
Following the development of the IEP, the team must decide on the
child’s placement.59 At a minimum, the IEP team should meet annually to
assess whether the child is making progress, to make any adjustments to the
IEP and placement to ensure progress, and to determine whether the child
continues to be eligible for services. Every three years, at a minimum, the
district must conduct a reevaluation. Additionally, for students over the
age of sixteen, the IEP process must include the development of
measurable postsecondary goals to ensure that a careful plan of transition is
followed.60
2.

Procedural Safeguards

To further the goal of providing FAPE for all children, the IDEA creates
procedural safeguards “to insure the full participation of the parents and
proper resolution of substantive disagreements” concerning the delivery of
special education services.61 These safeguards are not simply “procedural”
rights; they are the keys to guaranteeing a substantively appropriate
education.62 School districts that receive IDEA funds are required to
“establish and maintain procedures . . . [and] to ensure that children with
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards” with
respect to the FAPE provisions of the IDEA.63 The congressional intent
56. See § 1414(d)(1)(B) (mandating that if a child may be suspected of having a
learning disability, the team must also include at least one team member, other than the
child’s regular teacher, to observe the child’s academic performance in the regular
classroom).
57. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(V).
58. § 1414(d)(1)(A), (d)(3)(A)-(C).
59. § 1414(e).
60. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII).
61. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985). See
generally § 1415(b)(6)(A) (setting forth the guaranteed procedural safeguards
determined by Congress to protect every child’s right to a free appropriate public
education).
62. See Heldman ex rel. T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 150-51 (2d Cir. 1992).
63. § 1415(a).
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was not to mandate a particular level of service, but instead, to install a set
of procedures that should result in an offer of FAPE.64
Procedural protections are the core of the IDEA. Those protections can
be divided into a few separate categories: informed parental consent,
parental notice, parent participation in the IEP process, mediation, litigation
(administrative and court), state complaints, independent evaluations, and
protections for children with behavior problems and those who commit
disciplinary infractions.65 The due process protections must be viewed
within the context of the entire procedural framework.
State complaints, mediation, and litigation are the three mechanisms
contained in the IDEA that can be used by individuals to challenge the
decisions and actions of districts and other responsible agencies.66 Any
person, including a parent, may file a complaint with the applicable state
agency alleging a violation of the law.67 The state agency must investigate
and render a decision within a required timeframe.68 The IDEA also
strongly encourages alternative dispute resolution through mediation.69
This process is confidential and the mediation agreement is enforceable in
federal court. 70
Except for class action lawsuits, where administrative remedies have
been exhausted or proven futile, litigation in the special education arena
typically begins with an administrative due process hearing.71 Most states
adopt a one-tiered hearing system, with appeals filed directly with a federal

64. See § 1400(d)(1)(A) (“The purposes of this chapter are to ensure that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs
and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.”).
65. See § 1415(a)-(b) (outlining procedural safeguards required by the State or
educational agency to be put in place).
66. § 1415(b)(6), (e)-(f).
67. § 1415(b)(6).
68. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(i)(I).
69. § 1415(e).
70. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(i), (iii).
71. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988) (noting that bypassing the
administrative process is warranted when exhaustion is futile or inadequate); Frazier v.
Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 64 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiffs must
exhaust administrative process under IDEA before seeking purely money damages
under § 1983 unless exhaustion would be futile); Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist.,
967 F.2d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that, if plaintiffs wish to waive the
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, they must demonstrate that “the underlying purpose of
exhaustion would not be furthered by enforcing the requirement); Lester H. ex rel.
Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F. 2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that a student who
has failed to receive adequate education is entitled to administrative remedies
beginning with a due process hearing); Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of Ala., Inc. v.
Teague, 830 F.2d 158, 162 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming the district court’s ruling that, if
after a few due process hearings, it becomes clear that the process is overloaded, a
federal court action seeking relief after the EHA would then be appropriate).
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district or state trial court.72 Due process hearings and appeals garner the
most attention from policy makers and politicians in terms of the alleged
“cost” of due process. Yet, out of almost seven million children receiving
special education services through IDEA Parts B and C,73 only 2,033
families participated in hearings that resulted in a final decision.74
A parent may initiate an impartial hearing to resolve complaints
concerning “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child . . . .”75 A decision rendered in an
impartial hearing is final, absent a timely appeal.76 Independent Hearing
Officers have the power to order a school system to “take any number of
actions in order to correct violations of IDEA . . . including modifying an
IEP, implementing an existing IEP it has failed to carry out, providing a
particular placement, [or] providing a particular related service.”77 Other
available remedies include retroactive reimbursement for private placement
or services, advance payment for placement or services, and compensatory
education. Parents who prevail at an impartial hearing are entitled to
enforce hearing officer orders in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.78 Parents have enforceable rights in the procedural protections of the
72. See Zirkel & Scala, supra note 27, at 6-7 (finding that the most recent survey
claimed that forty-one states have one-tier systems and ten states have two-tier
systems); see also § 1415(g)(1)-(2) (in a two-tier system, parties must first exhaust an
appeal to an appeals officer or board before filing in court).
73. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Tables, supra note 17.
74. See Zirkel & Scala, supra note 27, at 4-5 (discussing the total number of
adjudications in the United States for fiscal year 2008-2009 as well as the breakdown
by the highest five jurisdictions by state).
75. § 1415(b)(6), (f).
76. § 1415(i).
77. EILEEN L. ORDOVER & KATHLEEN B. BOUNDY, EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES; A PRIMER FOR ADVOCATES 59 (Sharon Schmuck ed.,
1991); see § 1415(e)(1), (2)(B) (discussing factors of the mediation process, including
the requirement that the hearing officer with whom the State educational agencies or
Local educational agencies contract be qualified as “a parent training and information
center, . . . community parent resource center in the State, [or] an appropriate
alternative dispute resolution entity”).
78. See § 1415(l) (requiring that plaintiffs must exhaust the IDEA’s administrative
remedies before bringing claims under other federal statutes, such as §§ 504 and 1983
if the plaintiffs are seeking remedies that are also available under the IDEA); NievesMarquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 115-16 (1st Cir. 2003) (enforcing plaintiffs’
order when the school system neither appealed from, nor complied with, the order);
Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987) (granting parents standing to
bring a § 1983 action based on IDEA violations); D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of
Educ., No. CV-03-2489 (DGT), 2004 WL 633222, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004)
(allowing parents to enforce an IDEA claim under § 1983); R.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Bd. of
Educ., 99 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (asserting jurisdiction over claims
when the plaintiff prevailed at the hearing and the hearing officer granted relief that the
defendants failed to enforce); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 37, 42
(D.D.C. 1999) (stating that plaintiffs had enforceable right to implementation of
hearing officers’ determinations and settlement agreements including immediate
injunctive relief); see also Jeremy H. ex rel. W.E. Hunter v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist.,
95 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that parents can enforce orders of special
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IDEA and need not show particularized injury or prejudice as a result of
such violation.79
B. The IDEA’s Private School Tuition Remedy Constitutes an Inherent
Structural Bias that Disproportionately Benefits Wealthy Families
When a public school district fails to provide FAPE, a parent may obtain
tuition payment for his or her child to attend a private school under the
IDEA as a remedy through an impartial hearing and/or judicial proceeding.
Unfortunately, as discussed in greater detail below, this right is limited for
families without financial resources. Among other barriers, private schools
themselves may require up-front payments, contracts, or deposits, or have
admissions policies that have the effect of exclusion.
The right to private school tuition funding in the absence of FAPE was
solidified as a remedy by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1985 in the landmark
Burlington case,80 where the Court ruled parents may seek, as a proper
remedy, tuition reimbursement for private school when they believe their
disabled child is not getting an appropriate education at a public
institution.81 Later, in 1993, in Florence County School District Four v.
Carter,82 the Supreme Court considered whether parents could obtain a
similar remedy of tuition reimbursement if they chose to place their child in
a private school that was not approved by the state’s education department.
In Carter, the Court held that a parent could seek tuition in a non-approved
school as a remedy, finding that the right of a child to FAPE trumped the
administrative and procedural aspects of the IDEA.83 Until 2004, the right
to tuition payment as a remedy was exclusively one created under the broad
equitable powers of courts and hearing officers.84
education hearing officers in federal court); Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270,
1273-75 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); A.T. & I.T. ex rel. Z.T. v. N.Y. Educ. Dep’t, No. 98CV-4166 (JG), 1998 WL 765371, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1998) (same).
79. See Heldman ex rel. T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 157-59 (2d Cir. 1992)
(allowing challenges to procedures for assigning hearing officers); Blackman v. District
of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 2d 71, 80 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[W]hen a plaintiff’s rights to the
due process hearing are circumscribed in significant ways, a plaintiff need not show
prejudice in order to demonstrate injury.”); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 28 ED.
LAW. REP. 1053 (D.D.C. June 3, 1998) (stating that the IDEA creates an enforceable
right to timely implementation of the determinations of hearing officers and of
settlements).
80. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
81. Id. at 369-70.
82. 1510 U.S. 7 (1993).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 770
(6th Cir. 2001); Bd. of Educ. v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2000); St.
Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana, 142 F.3d 776, 783 (5th Cir. 1998); Gadsby v.
Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 954 (4th Cir. 1997); Oliver v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No.
301CV2627N, 2003 WL 22272304, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 2003); Douglas W. ex rel.
Douglas & Susan W. v. Greenfield Pub. Schs., 164 F. Supp. 2d 157, 171 (D. Mass.
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In 2004, the IDEA was amended and the right to tuition reimbursement
was expressly codified in the statute in 20 U.S.C. § 1412.85 The IDEA now
provides that
[i]f the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received
special education and related services under the authority of a public
agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary
school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or
a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the
cost of that enrollment . . . .86

The Court had the opportunity to square § 1412 with the holdings of
Burlington and Carter in the third decision in the reimbursement trilogy,
Forest Grove School District v. T.A.87 In Forest Grove, the Court
reaffirmed the availability of relief under § 1415(i), ruling that there is an
independent basis for funding a private school placement beyond the
authority granted by 20 U.S.C. § 1412. The Forest Grove decision held
that Burlington and Carter authorized reimbursement where FAPE was not
provided, “without regard to the child’s prior receipt of services.”88 While
these decisions were issued in the context of a private school tuition
remedy, funding, they apply to all areas of the IDEA and reinforce the
general principle that a strict statutory adherence will not be required where
a child’s right to FAPE is impaired.
Despite the underlying purpose of the IDEA, the language of the statute
and the decisions are framed in terms of “reimbursement,” thus drawing
2001); see also Emily S. Rosenblum, Note, Interpreting the 1997 Amendment to the
IDEA: Did Congress Intend to Limit the Remedy of Private School Tuition
Reimbursement for Disabled Children?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2748-55 (2009)
(discussing the legislative history and agency interpretation of section
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)). But see Reese ex rel. Reese v. Bd. of Educ., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1149,
1159 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (citing Eighth Circuit precedent regarding tuition reimbursement
review, rather than applying a liberal interpretation of the “equitable powers” standard,
the court narrowly interpreted the Burlington court’s statement that parents “are
entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public
placement violated the IDEA and that the private school placement was proper under
the Act”).
85. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006).
86. Id.
87. 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009).
88. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2494 n.10. Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the 1997
IDEA amendments generated a split of authority where some courts interpreted the
amendment to have created a categorical bar on a parent’s eligibility for tuition
reimbursement while other courts upheld the equitable powers granted to courts in the
Burlington and Carter decisions. Compare Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d
150, 158 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding the unilateral enrollment of a disabled child in a
private school before the public school had the opportunity to provide special education
services rendered the parents ineligible for tuition reimbursement), with Frank G. v. Bd.
of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 374 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the underlying purpose of the
IDEA is to provide disabled children with FAPE, and holding that the 1997
amendments did not limit a court’s equitable power to award tuition reimbursement
even though the parents unilaterally enrolled their child in a private school).
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into question whether families who cannot afford to pay up front and seek
reimbursement may use this self-help remedy. In certain jurisdictions,
many parents who can afford to pay private tuition and seek reimbursement
are able to take advantage of this remedy in administrative hearings. For
example, in New York City and Washington D.C., tuition reimbursement
cases account for millions of dollars in special education spending.89 Yet,
the question of whether a family with limited financial resources may
obtain private school tuition as a remedy is still unresolved in terms of the
language of the statute and judicial interpretation. School districts still
have the ability to challenge low- and middle-income families from
successfully obtaining this remedy solely based on income.
A New York federal district court recently issued a decision of first
impression, holding squarely that a parent without financial resources may
obtain payment for tuition owed to a school, even if that parent does not
have financial resources to pay the tuition and seek reimbursement.90 In
D.A. v. New York City Department of Education,91 the court concluded,
first, that the test for tuition funding approved by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Burlington should be applied to claims of retroactive tuition funding
based upon dicta in the Court’s decision suggesting that a prospective
injunction for tuition would be an appropriate remedy.92 The court then
conducted a review of the other types of cases where courts either awarded
prospective relief under the IDEA or deemed it appropriate in dicta.93
89. In New York City, in 2007-2008, schools paid “$89 million in private-school
tuition for disabled students whose parents had placed them there, up from $53 million
two years earlier.” Tamar Lewin, Court Affirms Reimbursement for Special Education,
TIMES,
June
22,
2009,
at
A16,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23education/23special.html.
Meanwhile,
in
Washington D.C., tuition reimbursements “represent fifteen percent of the district’s
budget.” Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, Debunking a Special Education Myth,
EDUC. NEXT (Mar. 15, 2007), http://educationnext.org/debunking-a-special-educationmyth/. In a recent case, a private school in Washington D.C., which had received over
$16 million in tuition reimbursements from the school district and serves a large
population of disabled children, came under investigation “for lax security, high rates
of truancy and inadequate academic programs.” Bill Turque, District Investigates
Special-Ed School, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com /local/
education/district-investigates-special-ed-school/2011/03/17/ABNsizk_story.html.
90. Mr. & Mrs. A. ex rel. D.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 421-23 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S.
359 (1985) (“[I]t seems clear beyond cavil that ‘appropriate’ relief would include a
prospective injunction directing the school officials to develop and implement at public
expense an IEP placing the child in a private school.”)).
93. See id. at 425-27 (reviewing Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275,
1285 (11th Cir. 2008) (prospective funding for compensatory education); Sabatini v.
Corning-Painted Post Area Sch. Dist., 78 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)
(prospective funding for stay-put placement orders); Connors v. Mills, 34 F. Supp. 2d
795, 804 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (dicta suggesting prospective tuition funding would be
appropriate)).
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Finally, the court set forth an analysis of the federal decisions construing 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).94
Finding no case directly on point, the court in D.A. nevertheless
concluded that in light of the purpose of the IDEA and the broad discretion
courts have to fashion a remedy under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), direct
retroactive tuition remedy is available to families without the resources to
front the costs of tuition.95 In so ruling, the court concluded that a
“contrary ruling would be entirely inconsistent with the IDEA’s statutory
purpose, including its goal of ensuring a FAPE to the least privileged of the
disabled children in our nation” and would be “irreconcilable with decades
of case law . . . holding that the exercise of rights under IDEA cannot be
made to depend on the financial means of a disabled child’s parents.”96
While this decision was encouraging, no circuit court has ruled on the
specific question of tuition relief for poor families; and, if decisions in
other contexts can be read as barometers, the circuits would likely be split
on this question. Two decisions highlight the different approaches of
courts on prospective funding in general. In Draper v. Atlanta Independent
School System,97 for example, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the school
district’s argument that the parent’s request for prospective payment for
compensatory education was tantamount to damages, and found that the
school district’s argument would provide wealthy families greater benefits
under IDEA than poor families.98 The court held that the IDEA “does not
relegate families who lack the resources to place their children unilaterally
in private schools to shouldering the burden of proving that the public
school cannot adequately educate their child before those parents can
obtain a placement in a private school.”99
In stark contrast, the First Circuit has held that the private school remedy
is, effectively, only available for wealthy children.100 In Diaz-Fonseca v.
Puerto Rico,101 the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of a
remedy that would have required the school district to pay future
educational expenses for the child, finding, under Burlington, that the
plaintiff was only entitled to “reimbursement” of expenses already
incurred.102
94. See D.A., 769 F. Supp. at 427.
95. Id. at 427-28.
96. Id. at 428.
97. 518 F.3d 1275.
98. Id. at 1286.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006); Ms. M. ex
rel. K.M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., 360 F.3d 267 (1st Cir. 2004).
101. 451 F.3d 13.
102. Id. at 35, 39.
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Given the purpose of the IDEA, it is unlikely that either the Supreme
Court or Congress meant to create a remedy for the lack of FAPE that
could not be accessed by families without the financial resources to pay
tuition of thousands of dollars and wait for reimbursement. The IDEA’s
core principle is a guarantee of FAPE to all eligible children.103
Throughout the IDEA, Congress has expressed a clear intent to support and
protect the interests of families without financial resources.104 As the Court
reiterated in Winkelman ex rel. Winkleman v. Parma City School District,105
parents’ rights under the IDEA must be interpreted so as to ensure that
some children are not excluded from its protections and benefits: “[w]e find
nothing in the statute to indicate that when Congress required States to
provide adequate instruction to a child ‘at no cost to parent,’ it intended
that only some parents would be able to enforce that mandate.” 106
Even in a case where hearing officers or judges are open to ordering
prospective tuition, parents who cannot pay tuition in advance face huge
logistical challenges. A parent without financial resources must first find a
private school willing to consider accepting the child without a substantial
deposit or tuition in advance. Even if fortunate enough to find a school
willing to provisionally accept the child, in order for a parent to become
eligible for tuition payment in some jurisdictions, that parent will likely
have to incur a substantial debt to the school. Due to the fact that the
administrative process is long, and schools are not likely to want to take
such a huge financial risk, this is not a realistic option for most parents.
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006); Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter,
510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993) (“[The] IDEA was intended to ensure that children with
disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and free.”); Sch. Comm. of
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 367 (1985) (“Congress stated the purpose
of the Act in these words: ‘to assure that all handicapped children have available to
them . . . [and] free appropriate public education . . . .’”).
104. See, e.g., § 1431(a)(5) (“Congress finds that there is an urgent and substantial
need . . . to enhance the capacity of State and local agencies and service providers to
identify, evaluate, and meet the needs of all children, particularly minority, lowincome, inner city, and rural children, and infants and toddlers in foster care.”); id. §
1437(b)(7) (any State “shall provide satisfactory assurance that policies and procedures
have been adopted to ensure meaningful involvement of underserved groups, including
minority, low-income, homeless, and rural families and children with disabilities who
are wards of the State . . . .”); id. § 1453(b)(8) (states must “describe the steps the State
education agency will take to ensure that poor and minority children are not taught at
higher rates by teachers who are not highly qualified . . .”); id. § 1471(a)(2)(iii) (grants
may be awarded to parent organizations “the parent and professional members of which
are broadly representative of the population to be served, including low-income parents
. . .”); id. § 1472(a)(1) (“The Secretary may award grants to, and enter into contracts
and cooperative agreements with, local parent organizations to support community
parent resource centers that will help ensure that underserved parents of children with
disabilities . . . have the training and information the parents need . . . .”); id. §
1481(d)(3)(C) (providing that in awarding grants and contracts the Secretary may give
priority to “projects that address the needs of . . . children from low income families”).
105. 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
106. Id. at 533.
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A family that locates a private school that might consider a child if
funding were awarded would be in a similarly disadvantaged position.
Such a school would be difficult to find, since that school would have to
hold open a seat until funding is resolved. Although hearings are supposed
to conclude in seventy-five days, personal experience suggests that, as the
result of continuances, they rarely do. A parent who found a school willing
to accept a disabled child if funding were awarded would never be able to
obtain a timely remedy of funding by using the administrative process.
In addition, courts and hearing officers often want to see that a child
made progress in the private placement before finding that placement is
appropriate. Moreover, it is particularly difficult to establish that a public
placement does not offer FAPE without access to timely independent
evaluations or outside experts to support the parent’s claim.
C. Independent Educational Evaluations
Under the IDEA, school districts are responsible for conducting
evaluations of children suspected of having disabilities. The statute
mandates that a “full and individual” evaluation be conducted and children
assessed in all areas related to the suspected disability.107 The evaluation
must use “a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant
functional, developmental, and academic information.”108 Such tools and
strategies must provide relevant information that directly assists persons in
determining that the educational needs of the child are provided.109 Tests
must be “selected and administered so as not to be discriminatory on a
racial or cultural basis” and the district is to use “technically sound
instruments that may assess the relative contribution of cognitive and
behavioral factors, in addition to physical or developmental factors.”110
Under the IDEA, parents have the right to an independent educational
evaluation (IEE) at public expense when they disagree with an evaluation
conducted by the school district.111 An IEE is an evaluation or assessment
conducted by professionals who do not work for the district and who are
supposed to be “independent.” The assessment is an important element of
due process, as it enables parents to obtain evaluative information as well
as suggestions on instructional strategies from professionals who are not
beholden to districts or under pressure to minimize education budgets.
If a parent requests an IEE, the district must, without unnecessary
107. § 1414(a)(1)(A), (b)(3)(B); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 8, §
200.4(b)(6)(vii).
108. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304 (2011).
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(3)(C).
110. § 1414(b)(2)(C), (b)(3)(A)(i).
111. § 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502.
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delay,112 ensure that the IEE is provided or file an administrative due
process hearing to show that either its own evaluation is appropriate or the
evaluation obtained by the parent as an IEE does not meet the legitimate
criteria for evaluations set forth by the school district.113 The statute itself
prescribes only one other way for an IEE to be conducted: a hearing officer
can order evaluations as part of a hearing—at the district’s expense. More
than two decades ago, the Department of Education’s Office of Special
Education Programs (OSEP) issued an opinion letter suggesting that a
parent who does not have money to pay for an IEE may first file a hearing
before the evaluation is done if funding is needed.114 However, it is clear
that the statute was written with the wealthy parent in mind.
Despite the fact that the IEE is supposed to be an important due process
right, it is very difficult for a parent without financial resources to exercise
this right. A parent with greater financial resources can pay for the
evaluation and present it at hearing to rebut the district’s claims that its own
testing was adequate. Often times, that parent can afford to have the
professional available to testify at the hearing. In fact, that parent can first
retain an independent specialist to first review the district’s assessments
and then determine whether any further testing is needed.
A parent who cannot afford to pay for an expert and who does not
already have an independent evaluation to establish the invalidity of the
district’s evaluation has a difficult hurdle to climb in terms of proof, even
with legal representation. A parent needs an IEE to prove his or her child’s
need for an IEE. Further, even though OSEP has opined that a parent may
file a hearing to obtain funding for an IEE, the hearing officer may allow
the district to conduct another assessment as a remedy before ordering an
IEE, although this right does not appear in the law.115
In some cases in which a parent is seeking prospective payment for an
IEE, the hearing officer has allowed the district to defend its own
evaluation, even if the district delayed or never responded to the parent’s
request. In contrast, in cases where a district has delayed and a parent has
112. One district court, applying the standard set out in 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b),
determined that the school district unnecessarily delayed the IEE when it waited three
weeks before asking the student to reiterate the request and then waited another eight
weeks to file a due process complaint to prove the appropriateness of its “in house”
evaluation, without any explanation. See Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. J.S., No.
C 06-0380 PVT, 2006 WL 3734289, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006).
113. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502.
114. Letter from Robert A. Davila, Assistant Secretary, Office of Special Educ. &
Rehabilitative Servs., to Honorable Robert F. Smith, Member, U.S. House of
Representatives (June 28, 1990) (“It should be noted that a parent may request a
hearing . . . or file a complaint with the State educational agency before the IEE is
performed if the parent believes that denial of advance funding for the IEE would deny
the parent a publicly-funded IEE.”).
115. Id.
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already obtained an IEE, that parent is typically reimbursed.
Additionally, parents without means have to overcome the fact that the
IDEA does not expressly allow a parent to obtain an IEE if the district fails
to evaluate—or timely evaluate—or fails to conduct a particular assessment
as part of the overall evaluation. Even though at least one court has ruled
that a parent is entitled to an IEE if a district fails to evaluate,116 the statute
does not expressly allow for that. Once a parent files a hearing asking for
an IEE based on an incomplete evaluation, the hearing officer may rule that
the parent is not entitled to the assessment because the district has failed to
conduct one first. Thus, there is no clear statutory remedy when and if a
district fails to evaluate a child or fails to conduct all of the assessments
necessary. The inability for parents without means to obtain timely IEEs
also affects their ability to request other remedies, such as private school
funding, a change in IEP program or placement, and compensatory
education.
D. Compensatory Education
Although the remedy of compensatory education is not specified in the
IDEA, it has evolved from the general equitable jurisdiction of courts and
hearing officers. Compensatory education is, generally, the right to ask for
make-up special education or general education instruction and related
services when a student has been denied a FAPE. Yet, the remedy varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.117 In terms of crafting a compensatory
education award, some courts hold that for each hour a student is denied
FAPE, the student is entitled to one hour of compensatory education.118
116. See Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. D.L., 548 F. Supp. 2d 815, 823 (C.D.
Cal. 2008) (recognizing that hearing officer can use equitable powers to order an IEE
even where district fails to evaluate a child).
117. See Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 527 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (“When a school district deprives a disabled child of [FAPE] in violation of the
[IDEA], a court fashioning ‘appropriate’ relief, may order compensatory education, i.e.,
replacement of educational services child should have received in the first place.”); Bd.
of Educ. of Oak Park v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 79 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting
that relief in the form of reimbursement for out-of-pocket educational expenses, or
“compensatory education” as it is formally called, is “indeed exceptional and nowhere
expressly authorized by the statute”); Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31
F.3d 1489, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that while compensatory education services
can be awarded as appropriate equitable relief, courts have discretion on how to craft
the relief, and “[t]here is no obligation to provide a day-for-day compensation for time
missed”); Sandhya Gopal, Compensatory Education and the IDEA, 35 SCH. L. BULL.
14 (2004) (discussing the evolution of compensatory education as a proper remedy by
tracking court decisions such as G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295 (4th
Cir. 2003)).
118. See, e.g., M.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 391-92, 396-97 (3d Cir.
1996) (“[A] disabled child is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to
the period of deprivation, [but] excluding . . . the time reasonably required for the
school district to rectify the problem.”); Westendorp v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273, 35 F.
Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (D. Minn. 1998) (“[W]here [plaintiff] was denied his IDEA rights
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Other courts have held that there is no requirement to provide an hour-forhour calculation, and require a flexible, individualized analysis of
compensation based upon the child’s individual needs.119 Some courts
have also awarded compensatory education to students who are over
twenty-one and past the age of eligibility for FAPE.120
Children from families without financial resources are the most likely to
require compensatory education, because their parents cannot afford private
school tuition, tutoring, and other services if a district is not providing
FAPE. Yet, it is often difficult for these parents to present sufficient
evidence of the need for compensatory education, owing to some of the
same difficulties discussed above in accessing independent experts and
private providers who can testify at a hearing. Some courts have ruled that
parents can never receive any type of prospective payments for
compensatory education. This ruling effectively eliminates compensatory
education as an effective remedy for many children.121
Another problem faced by parents without resources is that a hearing
officer who does not have expert reports upon which to rely may, more
often than not, simply remand the consideration of a compensatory remedy
back to the very school district that denied the child a FAPE. However,
some courts have ruled that remanding the creation of a compensatory
remedy back to a school district violates parents’ rights to an independent
fact-finder and impartial hearing.122
Most parents do not know that compensatory education exists as a
remedy. Although a district is legally mandated to provide parents with a
for six academic years, the court will presume that he is entitled to six academic years
of compensatory relief.”).
119. See, e.g., Reid, 401 F.3d at 516 (holding that a flexible approach, instead of
hour-for-hour method for calculating compensatory education, is more appropriate for
remedying past deprivations); G ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d
295 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Compensatory education involves discretionary, prospective,
injunctive relief crafted by a court to remedy what might be termed an educational
deficit created by an educational agency’s failure over a given period of time to provide
a FAPE to a student.”); Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1497 (“There is no obligation
to provide a day-for-day compensation for time missed. Appropriate relief is relief
designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the
IDEA.”).
120. See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249 (3d Cir.
1999) (“An award of compensatory education allows a disabled student to continue
beyond age twenty-one in order to make up for earlier deprivation of a [FAPE].”); Mrs.
C. ex rel. J.C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that in order
for court to award compensatory education to a student over age twenty-one, there must
have been a “gross” violation of the IDEA).
121. See Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2006).
122. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Fayette v. L.M. ex rel. T.D. 478 F.3d 307, 317-18 (6th
Cir. 2007) (providing that IEP teams cannot be in charge of remedy on remand because
it violates principles of impartial hearings); Reid, 401 F.3d at 516 (providing IEP teams
cannot determine remedy as it violates finality principles of IDEA’s due process
procedures).
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copy of the IDEA’s due process rights and safeguards,123 compensatory
education is not a remedy that is listed in the statute and is not required to
be included in the safeguards. Thus, parents without resources who do not
have access to legal counsel will never know that they have this remedy
unless they discover it by chance.
E. The IDEA Does Not Contain Emergency Procedures to Handle Any
Issue Other Than Disciplinary Issues for Suspended Children
Once a parent files a hearing under the IDEA, a district has thirty days to
try to settle the hearing through a “resolution meeting” before it can
commence. After thirty days, the hearing officer has another forty-five
days during which to issue a decision.124 In some states, there is a second
level of administrative review125 and a decision may not be issued for
months or even years, despite the statutory timeframes.126 Given the
number of adjournments and scheduling conflicts, hearings are rarely, if
ever, decided within the mandatory periods.
Although courts regularly rule that the failure to receive special or
regular education constitutes irreparable harm, and thus education delayed
is education denied,127 the IDEA hearing process does not contain any
emergency mechanism for due process, except in those situations where
children are subject to suspensions for their behavior.128 This is a
significant oversight in the due process system.129
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(1)(A), (d)(2) (2006).
124. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(b)(2)(ii) (2011).
125. See also Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems Under
the IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3 (2011), available at
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Due%20Process%20Hearing%20Systems.pd
f. States with a two-tiered system include Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. Id. at 5 tbl.1.
126. KEVIN L. LANIGAN ET AL., Nasty, Brutish . . . and Often Not Very Short: The
Attorney Perspective on Due Process, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW
CENTURY 213, 219 (Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al. eds., 2001).
127. See, e.g., Cosgrove ex rel. Cosgrove v. Bd. of Educ., 175 F. Supp. 2d 375, 39294 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Borough of Palmyra, Bd. of Educ. v. F.C. ex rel. R.C., 2 F. Supp.
2d 637, 645 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that the loss of an appropriate education “would
constitute irreparable harm”); A.T. & I.T. ex rel. Z.T. v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t., No.
98-CV-4166 (JG), 1998 WL 765371, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1998); J.B. v. Killingly
Bd. of Educ., 990 F. Supp. 57, 72 (D. Conn. 1997); Blazejewski ex rel. Blazejewski v.
Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 701, 703 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Cox v. Brown, 498 F. Supp.
823, 828-829 (D.D.C. 1980).
128. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B).
129. In fact, in some states it appears that administrative hearing officers believe
they have jurisdiction to issue interim orders. See, e.g., E. Penn. Sch. Dist., 9743-0809-LS; 10106-08-09-LS; 00283-09-10-LS, 110 LRP 26544 (Penn. SEA Jan. 7, 2010);
Burlington Pub. Schs., SEA-01-4513, 35 IDELR 80 (Mass. SEA June 14, 2001); East
Troy Cmty. Sch. Dist., SEA-95-001-A, 24 IDELR 794 (Wis. SEA July 22, 1996);
Chambers Cnty. Bd. of Educ., SEA-[no case number], 508 IDELR 34 (Ala. SEA
February 27, 1987). In contrast, hearing officers in other jurisdictions assert no
authority to issue an interim order other than one for a stay put order. Application of a
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Since the IDEA presumes district compliance with its procedures and
does not contemplate that children will be out of school, not timely
assessed, or not receiving agreed-upon services, perhaps Congress did not
see a need to adopt emergency hearing procedures for families that cannot
afford private school tuition. Yet, since these situations are all too realistic,
the failure of the IDEA to ensure that parents of children who have not
committed a disciplinary infraction may seek emergency relief without
being forced into an expensive—and generally out of reach—court action,
is a significant gap in the procedures.
F. The IDEA Should Contain a Uniform Statute of Limitations Period
In 2004, the IDEA was amended to require a party who files a due
process complaint to do so within two years of when the party knew or
should have known of the alleged violation, or within such timeframe as a
state allows.130 At this time, two tolling provisions have been adopted in
the “Exceptions to the Timeline” provision, which reads, in relevant part:
The timeline shall not apply to a parent if the parent was prevented from
requesting the hearing due to—(i) specific misrepresentations by the
local educational agency that it had resolved the problem forming the
basis of the complaint; or (ii) the local educational agency withholding
of information from the parent that was required under this part to be
provided to the parent under this part.131

Most of the IDEA’s rights are considered to be a “floor”; states may
adopt greater rights for parents but may not reduce parent rights below
those afforded by the IDEA.132 Yet, for this critically important aspect of
due process, the IDEA allows states to shorten the limitations period.133 As
a result, some states have elected to significantly reduce the statute of
limitations down to one year or less.134 It is not equitable for parents’
ability to lodge complaints under a federal statute to have different rights
depending on the whims of the state legislatures, particularly when states
Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 10-083, at *1 (N.Y. SEA 2010), available at
http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2010/10-083.pdf.
130. See § 1415(b)(6)(B), (f)(3)(C) (emphasis added). Comments to the IDEA
regulations note specifically that “hearing officers will have to make determinations, on
a case-by case basis, of factors affecting whether the parent ‘knew or should have
known’ about the action that is the basis of the complaint.” Assistance to States for the
Education of Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006).
131. See § 1415(f)(3)(D).
132. § 1407(a).
133. § 1415(f)(3)(c); see also Lynn M. Daggett et al., For Whom the School Bell
Tolls But Not the Statute of Limitations: Minors and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717 (2005) (discussing the ways in which
courts have grappled with circumstances where more than one statute of limitation may
apply).
134. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.6(g) (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 115.80
(West 2011).
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have significant financial interest in limiting parents’ abilities to redress
violations. Shortened limitations periods protect districts and states that
fail to offer FAPE, and provide a way for districts to receive and maintain
IDEA funding with little risk of parent challenge. Thus, districts can count
children as receiving special education services for purposes of receiving
money and there is little, if any, check on whether those services are
actually being provided.
The fact that the IDEA does not require parents to be notified that they
have a remedy of compensatory education renders the application of the
two year—or in some cases even shorter—limitations period for
compensatory education cases particularly egregious.
Further, the IDEA does not contain a specific tolling provision that
would enable children to assert their rights at the age of majority, whereas
most limitations periods adopted at the state level do allow for tolling for
this reason. Lack of tolling for children who reach the age of majority
effectively strips away the rights of children who were subject to systemic
and long-term denials of FAPE and had parents who were not able or
willing to assert their rights.
G. Notice and Safeguards Provisions Do Not Adequately Protect the
Rights of Parents and Students Without Access to Lawyers and Advocates
The IDEA requires that districts and public agencies distribute very
specific notices to parents as part of the special education process. Prior
Written Notice must be provided whenever the district “refuses to initiate
or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the
child.”135
Prior Written Notice must be “written in an easily
understandable manner,” defined as “understandable to the general
public.”136 In the case of evaluations, the “Prior Written Notice” must
135. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3)(B). Prior Written Notice must contain, at a minimum:
(a) a description of the action proposed or refused by the agency; (b) an
explanation of why the agency proposes or refuses to take the action and a
description of each evaluation procedure, assessment, record, or report the
agency used as a basis for the proposed or refused action; (c) a statement that
the parents of a child with a disability have protection under the procedural
safeguards of this part and, if this notice is not an initial referral for evaluation,
the means by which a copy of a description of the procedural safeguards can be
obtained; (d) sources for parents to contact to obtain. assistance in
understanding the provisions of 20 U.S.C. § 1415; (e) a description of other
options considered by the IEP Team and the reason why those options were
rejected; and (f) a description of the factors that are relevant to the agency’s
proposal or refusal.
§ 1415(c)(1).
136. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(c) (2011). Prior Written Notice is “[o]ne of the most
important rights that parents have under the IDEA.” Tara J. Parillo, Comment, The
Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA): Parental Involvement and the Surrogate
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include “a description of the proposed evaluation or reevaluation and the
uses to be made of the information.”137
Districts must also distribute a document detailing the IDEA’s
procedural safeguards to parents that contains a full explanation of the
procedural safeguards, available under the statute and regulation relating to
the due process rights.138 Similar to Prior Written Notice, the safeguards
must be “written in an easily understandable manner,” meaning
“understandable to the general public.”139
Although these protections theoretically appear significant, in practice
they do not serve to protect and inform the rights of families and young
people without financial resources.140 Further, enforcement is limited.
Research has found that districts rarely comply with the requirement to
ensure that the safeguards issued are in easy-to-read language accessible to
parents who have not attended college.141
1.

The IDEA’s Information Access Provisions Should be Strengthened

The IDEA requires that school districts ensure that the information in the
notices and safeguards is accessible to parents with limited literacy and
those who may have other communication deficits.142
The 2004
amendments even authorize the Secretary of Education to prescribe and
widely disseminate a model notice of safeguards.143 However, there are
several major gaps with respect to these statutory provisions that make
these notice and safeguard provisions virtually meaningless for families
that are not highly educated or cannot afford to hire a lawyer for advice.144
Appointment Process, 74 OR. L. REV. 1339, 1342 (1995).
137. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1)(A).
138. § 1415(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a).
139. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.504, 300.503(c).
140. Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New IDEA,
Getting Behind No Child Left Behind and Getting Outside of It All, 15 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 11-12 (2004) [hereinafter Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning?]
(“Despite all attempts at promoting self-advocacy, the reality is that many individuals
will require more intensive support . . . . Even the much-vaunted technical assistance
parent/student advocates dispense can prove to be ineffectual if the client is unable to
translate the advice and coaching into effective advocacy [at the IEP table].”).
141. Julie L. Fitzgerald and Marley W. Watkins, Parents’ Rights in Special
Education: The Readability of Procedural Safeguards, 72 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 497,
498 (2006).
142. Id. at 507.
143. 20 U.S.C. § 1417(e)(3).
144. This is a vintage grievance. See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION
ACT: MAKING SCHOOLS WORK FOR ALL OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN (1995), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1995/09051995 (including a parent’s testimony, “I
was one of those parents who left . . . IEPs like someone who has left a foreign movie
without the subtitles. I felt a very small and incidental part of this procedure . . . .”);
see also Fitzgerald & Watkins, supra note 141, at 506; Carmen Gomez Mandic et al.,
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2. The IDEA Does Not Ensure Participation of Parents who Have
Limited English Language or Literacy Skills
The IDEA does not ensure that parents whose native language is not
English or who are not literate in the English language can access the
special education process for their children. Some areas of the country
educate significant numbers of students who are English Language
Learners (ELLs).145 Many parents of ELL students are not proficient in
understanding, speaking, and reading English. Research has shown that
only 13% of Americans are deemed “proficient” when it comes to literacy
skills.146 Only 71% of American students graduate from high school on
time and, for certain populations like Latino and African-American
students, that number drops significantly.147
While the IDEA requires that notice and safeguards be provided in a
parent’s native language and made accessible for non-readers, the law does
not mandate that a child’s educational records and reports are translated
into a parent’s native language or made accessible to parents who cannot
read or have other communication deficits.148 Thus, most general
Readability of Special Education Procedural Safeguards, J. SPECIAL EDUC., Mar. 10,
2010,
at
*4,
available
at
http://sed.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/03/10/0022466910362774.full.pdf (finding
that 94% of state’s procedural safeguards were written at college or graduate school
level).
145. See, e.g., ROSE M. PAYAN & MICHAEL T. NETTLES, EDUC. TESTING SERV.,
CURRENT STATE OF ENGLISH-LANGUAGE LEARNERS IN THE U.S. K-12 STUDENT
POPULATION
2
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ets.org/Media/Conferences_and_Events/pdf/ELLsympsium/ELL_factsheet.
pdf (finding that in 2004-05, 5.1 million students, 10.5%, of the United States’ student
population, are ELLs and that six states—Arizona, California, Texas, New York,
Florida, and Illinois—contain 61% of the ELL population). Large population states are
not alone, however, as many states have seen significant growth in their ELL
population over a similar period. See, e.g., KATHLEEN FLYNN & JANE HILL, MIDCONTINENT RESEARCH FOR EDUC. & LEARNING, ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNERS: A
GROWING
POPULATION
2-3
(2005),
available
at
http://www.mcrel.org/pdf/policybriefs/5052pi_pbenglishlanguagelearners.pdf
(explaining that, for example, Colorado, Nebraska, and South Dakota saw the number
of ELL students in their elementary schools grow three-fold between 1990 and 2000).
146. National Assessment of Adult Literacy, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
http://nces.ed.gov/naal/kf_demographics.asp (last visited June 17, 2011).
147. See ALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT EDUC., FACT SHEET: HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS
IN
AMERICA
1
(2009),
available
at
http://www.all4ed.org/files/GraduationRates_FactSheet.pdf (“[B]arely half of African
American and Hispanic students earn diplomas with their peers [and i]n many states the
difference between white and minority graduation rates [is as much] as 40 or 50
percentage points.”); see also JAY P. GREENE, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY
RESEARCH, HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (rev. 2002),
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_baeo.pdf (documenting the substantial
difference between African American and Hispanic graduation rates as compared to
their regional and school district peers).
148. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(4), (d)(2) (requiring that notices of placement decisions
and procedural safeguards be provided in parents’ native language unless “clearly . . .
not feasible”); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(e) (requiring interpreter at IEP meetings).
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education records, evaluations, and IEPs are not translated for parents or
made accessible or explained to parents who cannot read English. Those
families are effectively excluded from having meaningful involvement in
the special education process for their children.149
3. The IDEA Does Not Mandate a Written Explanation of the Special
Education Process
The IDEA does not require districts to provide written information to
parents that explains the special education process in plain language. Thus,
parents receive complicated notices and descriptions of procedural and due
process rights without having a basic understanding of how the underlying
special education system functions. Therefore, in practice families without
attorneys or access to advocates, who can explain the special education
process, cannot meaningfully invoke due process rights because they are
generally not able to identify that something has gone wrong in the special
education process. According to one commentary, “To be successful, . . .
parents must be knowledgeable about their child and his disability. They
must also be able to understand the proceedings of the IEP meetings, voice
disagreement and seek clarification and be willing to utilize the [conflict
resolution] processes. Successful decision-making and implementation
require skills and knowledge beyond the reach of many.”150
4. The IDEA Should Require Individualized Notices When Students Leave
School Without a Diploma
One of the most significant gaps in the IDEA’s due process system is
that the statute fails to take account of the fact that so many children leave
school without a diploma because of inadequate special education services.
Although states have not yet been able to develop a uniform way of
reporting graduates with IEPs, a review of student exit data published by
the Department of Education demonstrates that the majority of students
Even in California, with its longstanding experience in providing interpretation and
translation for monolingual Spanish-speaking parents, the theory may be better than the
reality; see, e.g., Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. J.S., No. C 06-0380 PVT, 2006
WL 3734289, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006) (stating that the school district gave
Spanish-speaking parent only English language version of assessment).
149. See, e.g., Patricia A. Massey & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters:
Toward a Law School Model for Serving Youth with Special Education Needs,
CLINICAL L. REV. Spring 2005, at 271, 281-82 (2005) (discussing advocacy barriers
faced by parents who speak limited English, and are low-income and lacking formal
education).
150. See id. at 279-80 (2005) (internal citations omitted) (“Other characteristics of
parents that may interfere with their ability to advocate for FAPE for their children
include: fear of retaliation against the student; a desire to maintain good relations with
the school; cultural norms that place educators in positions of unquestioned authority;
feelings of shame about having a child with a disability; and a sense of
powerlessness.”).
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with IEPs leave school without a diploma.151 Across the United States,
only 39% of students with disabilities ages sixteen to twenty-one who
exited the special education system earn a regular diploma.152 The
outcomes are far worse for certain classifications of children, as well as in
some states and cities throughout the country.153 For example, only 24% of
students classified as “emotionally disturbed” who exited special education
earned a regular diploma.154 Black students are twice as likely as white
students to be labeled emotionally disturbed.155 Dropout rates are deemed
twice as high for special education students than for general education
students.156 A significant number of organizations have recognized
students with disabilities drop out of school; national advocacy, policy, and
research groups focus heavily on improving graduation rates and transition
outcomes for children with disabilities.157
Despite this, the IDEA only recognizes that graduation with a regular
151. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), DATA ACCOUNTABILITY
CTR., https://www.ideadata.org/PartBExiting.asp (last visited June 17, 2011).
152. See id. (requiring states to collect data on exiting students ages fourteen to
twenty-one) (percentage calculated by authors). The exit categories are: (1) Graduated
with regular high school diploma, (2) Received a certificate, (3) Reached maximum
age, (4) Transferred to regular education, (5) Died, (6) Moved, Known to be
continuing, (7) Dropped out, (8) Total Exited Special Education. Id. (follow link
“2009-10 (csv)”). There has been significant controversy over the “Moved, Known to
be continuing” category, as this figure arguably masks students who should more
properly be considered dropouts and/or “moved to juvenile and adult detention, jails
and prisons.” See id. For purposes of this Article, those students were kept in the pool.
To obtain the 39% figure, exiting students ages fourteen and fifteen, who are too young
to graduate, were eliminated from the data. The 39% figure was then obtained by
subtracting from the total number of students who exited special education by those
who returned to general education or died and then dividing that figure by the students
who earned regular diplomas. See id.
153. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), supra note 151 (noting
that in New York City, for example, 50% of all of the students who receive special
education receive services in special education classes and yet, according to the City’s
statistics, the graduation rate for children in special education classes in the city is only
4.4%). See generally ARISE COAL., EDUCATE! INCLUDE! RESPECT! A CALL FOR
SCHOOL SYSTEM REFORM TO IMPROVE THE EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF STUDENTS
WITH
DISABILITIES,
(2009),
http://www.arisecoalition.org/Include!%20%20Educate!%20%20Respect!.pdf.
154. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), supra note 151
(percentage calculated by authors by subtracting from the total number of students who
exited special education by those who returned to general education or died and then
dividing that figure by the students who earned regular diplomas).
155. 1 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 28TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONG. ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, 2006 48
tbl. 1-9 (2006) (noting that black students had a risk ration of being classified as
emotionally disturbed at 2.24, compared to white students at 0.85).
156. See Martha L. Thurlow et al., Students with Disabilities who Drop Out of
School—Implications for Policy and Practice, NAT’L CTR. ON SECONDARY EDUC. &
TRANSITION,
June
2002,
available
at
http://www.ncset.org/publications/printresource.asp?id=425 (citing Blackorby &
Wagner (citation omitted)).
157. See, e.g., id.
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diploma constitutes a “change of placement” that requires Prior Written
Notice and triggers the IDEA’s procedural safeguards.158 Further, before a
student graduates, a district must provide the parent with “a summary of the
child’s academic achievement and functional performance, which shall
include recommendations on how to assist child in meeting the child’s
postsecondary goals.”159
Yet, despite the fact that so many children leave school without a
diploma—whether due to a lack of progress, dropping out, being
discharged or transferred to alternative programs, or ending up
incarcerated—the IDEA does not provide any specific notices or
procedural protections for those students or their parents, who are
presumably in far greater need of specific protections than those students
who earn diplomas.
H. Due Process Protections Should be Clarified to Include Truancy Within
the Scope of Protected Behavior
As noted above, one of the underlying purposes of the original special
education statute was to prevent the exclusion of students with disabilities
from school.160 Section 504 provides a basic level of protection in that a
student with a disability cannot be subject to any discrimination based upon
conduct that is a manifestation of his or her disability.161 Early decisions
under Section 504 and the IDEA held that children who exhibit behavioral
difficulties must have certain protections in place to ensure they are not
excluded or punished based upon disability-related behavior.162 Eventually
the specific substantive and procedural protections for disabled students
exhibiting behavioral problems in school were written into the IDEA.163
158. 34 C.F.R. § 300.102 (a)(3)(iii) (2011).
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(5)(B)(ii) (2006).
160. See supra notes 34-36, 39 and accompanying text; Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,
308 (1988).
161. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006) (Section 504 and its regulations provide that
“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, . . . shall,
solely by reason of his or her disability . . . be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
162. S-1 ex rel. P-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
before disabled students could be expelled from school a “qualified group of
individuals” must determine “that no relationship existed between [the plaintiffs’]
handicap and their misconduct,” and that this group must be composed of the same
experts that determined the child’s placement and handicap under the IDEA); see
Honig, 484 U.S. at 308 (under both Section 504 and the IDEA, team of experts must
evaluate child and determine whether behavior was a manifestation of child’s disability
before disciplinarily changing student’s placement); Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Maher,
793 F.2d 1470, 1480 (9th Cir. 1986); Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982).
163. Protecting Students with Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions About
Section 504 and the Education of Children with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/504faq.html#interrelationship (last visited
June 17, 2011) (noting the interrelationship between Section 504 and the IDEA provide
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Since the initial inclusion of the disciplinary protections, these protections
were expanded and strengthened in 1997 and then amended in 2004 to
afford schools greater leeway in excluding students and making law
enforcement referrals.164 These provisions have been the subject of much
controversy.165
The current version of the IDEA’s disciplinary protections incorporates
several elements: a Manifestation Determination Review,166 a Functional
Behavior Assessment,167 a Behavioral Intervention Plan,168 and a guarantee
of FAPE for children even when they are subject to suspension for more
than ten days in any school year.169 Certain guidelines were also
established for services for students in longer-term removals who commit
more serious disciplinary infractions.170
In addition to the due process provisions of 20 U.S.C. § 1415, the IDEA
requires all IEP teams to include “positive behavioral supports” using
research based methods for children whose behavior interferes with their
own learning or the education of other children.171 Even with the
provisions in the statute, students with disabilities are subject to much
higher rates of student suspensions, with significant over-representation of
African-American and Latino males being suspended in many
students with a network of protections that are intended to preserve the disabled
student’s right and ability to FAPE: “Section 504 prohibits discrimination on the basis
of disability in programs or activities that receive Federal financial assistance from the
U.S. Department of Education. Title II [of the ADA] prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability by state and local governments. . . . [The IDEA is] a statute which
funds special education programs. Each state educational agency is responsible for
administering IDEA within the state and distributing the funds for special education
programs. IDEA is a grant statute and attaches many specific conditions to the receipt
of Federal IDEA funds. Section 504 and the ADA are antidiscrimination laws and do
not provide any type of funding.”).
164. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997); Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004).
165. For articles prior to the 2004 IDEA reauthorization, see, for example, Philip
T.K. Daniel, Discipline and the IDEA Reauthorization: The Need to Resolve
Inconsistencies, 142 EDUC. L. REP. 591 (2000); Anne Proffitt Dupre, A Study in Double
Standards, Discipline, and the Disabled Student, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2000); Lauren
Zykorie, Reauthorizing Discipline for the Disabled Student: Will Congress Create a
Better Balance in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)?, 3 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 101 (2003). Since the 2004 IDEA reauthorization, these provisions
remain controversial. See, e.g., Randy Chapman, The Discipline Process for Students
with Disabilities Under the IDEA, COLO. LAW. July 2007, at 63; Perry A. Zirkel,
Suspensions and Expulsions of Students with Disabilities: The Latest Requirements,
214 EDUC. L. REP. 445 (2007).
166. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E).
167. § 1415(k)(1)(D), (F).
168. § 1415(k)(1)(F).
169. § 1412(a)(1).
170. § 1415(k)(1)(B).
171. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i).
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jurisdictions.172
As noted above, approximately 40% of students with IEPs appear to
leave school without a diploma.173 Further, truancy among special
education high school students is widespread.174 In many states, children
who are truant are actually prosecuted in juvenile or family courts and may
be incarcerated if they fail to attend school regularly after a judicial
“intervention.”175
While the IDEA requires significant due process procedures and
protections from a child who hits another child or curses at a teacher, it
contains no express protections for truant students. Many school districts
and courts do not treat truancy as a “behavior” subject to protection under
the IDEA. The treatment of truancy as if it were separate from the concept
of “behavior that demonstrates a lack of progress” is more often than not a
manifestation of the child’s disability exacerbated and triggered by
“warehousing” children in inappropriate educational settings. This is yet
another major gap in the statute’s protections. Vulnerable students who
end up with attendance difficulties after years of failure and defeat are
blamed instead of helped.176 While advocates and lawyers can make
arguments on a child-by-child basis that truancy has to be properly
addressed by the IEP team, this strategy, standing alone, is insufficient to
tackle this significant issue.
By mandating that school districts were responsible for the education of
students with behavioral difficulties, districts had to develop strategies,
based on research, to educate students they could no longer exclude based
on disciplinary infractions. The same pressure should be brought to bear to
address truancy; until districts are held fully accountable for those students,
they will not be forced to develop better programs for failing high school
age students.
I. Students’ IDEA Rights Should be Clarified and Strengthened
The question of whether, and to what extent, children and young people
have or should have rights in the special education process is important, but
complex. Thus, a full discussion of these issues is not attempted here.
However, given the importance of the issues, particularly for students from
low-income families, children whose parents are not native English
speakers, children whose parents are sick or unavailable, and children who
172. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
174. See Dean Hill Rivkin, Truancy Prosecutions of Students and the Right [To]
Education, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming 2011).
175. Id.
176. Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 520 F.3d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 2008).
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are in the foster care or juvenile and adult education systems, some of the
overarching issues bear mentioning.
States may transfer rights from parents to any student who reaches the
age of majority in that state, except for a child who has been determined to
be incompetent under state law.177 If a transfer is made, notice must be
provided to both the student and the parent, all other rights accorded to the
parents are transferred to the child, and the agency must notify the student
and the parent of the transfer of rights.178 If a state adopts a transfer of
rights provision and a student is not able to provide informed consent—
even if the student has not been declared legally “incompetent”—the state
can adopt procedures by which a parent can be appointed as an educational
decision-maker.179 No later than one year before a student reaches the age
of majority, the IEP must include a statement documenting that the student
has been advised of the fact that rights will transfer when the student
reaches the age of majority.180 Juxtaposed against the reality faced by most
older students who receive special education services, these provisions do
not come close to serving the interests of most students.
It is a serious flaw in the statutory scheme that the IDEA fails to mandate
that all students be provided notice of their rights until just prior to, or at
the age of majority. This is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that
so many students age seventeen and over leave school without a diploma.
Regardless of the federal statute, in almost every state, once students turn
eighteen they have the right to make their own educational decisions,
marry, vote, and even join the military. In many states, youth over fifteen
are charged as adults if they commit a crime.
The fact that students in states where rights do not transfer seem to be
virtually excluded from the process, and are not clearly mandated to
receive certain notices, are omissions that should be addressed through an
IDEA amendment.181 This is particularly true since school districts are
required to appoint a surrogate parent in cases where the parent cannot, or
will not, participate in the special education process. Many young people
simply stop attending high school because their educational needs are not
being met. Yet, when they are awarded different programs and services that
meet their needs through a hearing, they will diligently attend and succeed.
Students who leave school discouraged and disengaged do not know that
177. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (m)(1) (2006).
178. Id.
179. § 1415 (m)(2).
180. § 1414 (d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(cc).
181. The Second Circuit ruled years ago that students over the age of eighteen, and
their parents, are required to have sufficient notices prior to a termination of special
education services even in a state where rights are not transferred. Mrs. C. ex rel. J.C.
v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990).
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their parents can take steps to change their educational program and
placement.
Further, this provision casts doubt on whether students who are legal
adults have standing to file for hearings with respect to their own
educational rights, a concept at odds with the general thrust of all state
laws. For states in which rights are transferred, enforcement and oversight
appear to be significant problems.
J. Limitations On Attorneys’ Fees And Expert Witness Fees Have
Effectively Eviscerated the Ability of Families Without Means to Access the
IDEA Due Process System
The incentive of attorney-fee shifting was incorporated into the IDEA in
1986, eight years after the landmark enactment of the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Award Statute.182 This reversal of the longstanding rule
that parties’ should bear their own fees in litigation recognized that the
availability of fees to prevailing parties in civil rights and other cases where
private parties were enforcing public mandates was essential to attract
lawyers to this genre of litigation, where parties typically could not afford
the costs and fees of often protracted litigation, and for the deterrent—
compliance-generating—effects that fee-shifting should have on
government bodies. The shifting of expert witness fees to losing school
systems was also an indispensable component of ensuring access to the due
process hearing system and beyond.
Lawyers in IDEA cases play crucial roles in understanding the often
obscure requirements in the IDEA and, perhaps most importantly, knowing
what remedies are available through the courts. As noted above, parents
with lawyers prevail at higher rates than those without.183 The necessity of
expert testimony in most IDEA cases also cannot be disputed. Without
skilled experts to counter the expertise enjoyed by school systems, parents
are at a distinct disadvantage.
Thus, the erosion of the availability of statutory fees under the civil
rights laws and the IDEA has been decried by commentators who view this
trend as a stark display of hostility by the United States Supreme Court and
lower courts to the assertion of progressive statutory and constitutional
claims in the federal courts.184 The elimination of the so-called catalyst
182. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(B), with 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (allowing the
court to grant reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of costs to the prevailing party who is
the parent of a disabled child in the former, but also allowing the court to grant fees to a
successful local or state educational agency under severely limited circumstances).
183. See ARCHER, supra note 27, at 7.
184. See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston, & Laura Beth Nielson, The Procedural Attack
on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney
General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1091 (2007); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro
Bono and Private Attorneys General, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1459 (2007).
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theory by the Supreme Court, in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v.
West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources185—a non-IDEA
case—was a significant reversal for litigants seeking access to counsel
under fee-shifting statutes. By holding that settlements must have the
“imprimatur” of the court,186 the strategy of government defendants who
decide after extensive legal work is performed on a case to offer a decent
settlement on the merits of the case—without attorney’s fees—and insist
that the settlement not be presented to the court for signing, has created an
exquisite conflict for lawyers representing un-rich clients. These clients
will likely be strongly inclined to accept the deal, leaving the lawyer
without an avenue for filing for fees. The chilling effect of this strategy on
access to counsel is evident.
Another recent attorney’s fees case decided by the Supreme Court,
Astrue v. Ratliff,187 although decided under the Equal Access to Justice
Act,188 potentially undercuts the ability of impecunious clients to obtain
counsel. In Astrue, the Court interpreted the prevailing party language of
the Equal Access to Justice Act to hold that an award of attorney’s fees was
payable to the plaintiff, not to the attorney.189 This subjected the fee to the
government’s administrative offset program for a pre-existing debt, leaving
the attorney with either no fee or a vastly reduced one.190 It is too early to
gauge whether the application of Astrue in IDEA cases will have a serious
adverse effect.
A final restriction on meaningful access for families of limited means
occurred in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v.
Murphy,191 where the Supreme Court held that parties who prevailed in
IDEA due process hearings could not recover as part of “costs” outlays for
expert witnesses.192 The practical consequences of this decision are limited
because many families with even modest resources cannot afford the
upfront costs of expert assistance, which can easily run into the thousands
of dollars.
Ironically, the elimination of expert witness fees under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Murphy did little to impact families without financial
resources, since they could not afford to pay expert witness fees to begin
with and few experts are willing to work on a contingency fee basis. This
185. 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001).
186. Id. at 610.
187. 130 S. Ct. 2524 (2010).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A) (2006); see also 130 S. Ct. at 2530 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
189. 130 S. Ct. at 2528-29.
190. Id. at 2532-33.
191. 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
192. Id. at 304.
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is particularly true in areas in which qualified and knowledgeable experts
are in high demand and have waiting lists even for paying clients.
Similarly, the Court’s ruling in Winkelman, establishing that parents can
represent their children on a pro se basis in court,193 is not going to assist
the majority of families who do not have a basic understanding of their
IDEA rights.
K. The Supreme Court’s Decision to Place the Burden of Proof on Parents
Harms All Children
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided Schaffer v. Weast,194 in which the
Court held that “the burden of proof in an administrative hearing
challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief.”195
The Court in Schaffer noted that the “burden of proof” has historically
encompassed both the “burden of persuasion”—the party who loses if the
evidence is in “equipoise,”—and the “burden of production,”—the party
required to come forward with evidence.196 The Schaffer Court restricted
its ruling to a determination only on the burden of persuasion, as it was
defined in that case; yet, the decision has generally been interpreted to be
more far-reaching and to require parents to meet both burdens.197 The
Schaffer decision prompted numerous articles taking a variety of positions
concerning both the Court’s decision and the question of the proper
allocation of burden of proof.198
193. Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535
(2007) (finding that parents have a basis for representing their children in court due to
parental interest in the education of children).
194. 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
195. Id. at 56.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 65. Read closely, the decision in Schaffer makes clear that the Court
contemplated that, when a district seeks to change an IEP, it would be the district that
files the hearing. See id. However, that finding suggests the Court may have
interpreted the IDEA to require a district to file a hearing when it proposes a change in
an IEP. Id. This is not a generally accepted principle. Typically, districts may change
an IEP or placement unless a parent files for due process.
198. See, e.g., Lara Gelbwasser Freed, Cooperative Federalism Post-Schaffer: The
Burden Of Proof And Preemption In Special Education, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 103
(2009); Anne E. Johnson, Evening The Playing Field: Tailoring The Allocation Of The
Burden Of Proof At Idea Due Process Hearings To Balance Children’s Rights And
Schools’ Needs, 46 B.C. L. REV. 591 (2005); Joanne Karger, A New Perspective On
Schaffer v. Weast: Using A Social-Relations Approach To Determine The Allocation
Of The Burden Of Proof In Special Education Due Process Hearings, 12 U.C. DAVIS J.
JUV. L. & POL’Y 133 (2008); Nicole Thompson, The Great Burden On American
Disabled Students: The Aftermath of Schaffer v. Weast, MOD. AM. Spring 2008, at 21;
Jennifer M. Saba, Undue Deference: Toward A Dual System Of Burdens Under The
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 133 (2007); William
D. White, Where To Place The Burden: Individuals With Disabilities Education Act
Administrative Due Process Hearings, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2006); Jordan L. Wilson,
Missing The Big Idea: The Supreme Court Loses Sight Of The Policy Behind The
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act in Schaffer v. Weast, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 161
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Leaving aside the questions of statutory construction and congressional
intent, the practical implication of this decision on the lives of students
without financial resources is undeniable. While this decision has harmed
all children, for all of the reasons discussed above, it has a particularly
disproportionate impact on families of children without financial
resources.199 Those families cannot pay experts, will not have access to
IEEs, and cannot afford to purchase the services on an up-front basis to
establish a record of progress and success. In those states where discovery
is typically not a part of due process proceedings, all of the documents and
evidence required to establish proof will be in the custody and control of
the hearing officers. Further, many families without resources have to
proceed to due process without an attorney and, more likely than not,
cannot obtain attorney’s fees unless a case proceeds all the way to a
decision. It is extremely difficult for a family in this situation to establish
that a district failed to comply with the procedures and the substantive
provisions of the IDEA in terms of whether an evaluation has been validly
conducted or FAPE provided.
Since most of the litigation under IDEA involves tuition reimbursement
claims, districts are extremely concerned with keeping and shifting the
burden back to parents. There are few, if any, voices protecting the rights
of other families in this dialogue, and the costs for districts are high. In the
wake of Schaffer, states have enacted legislation placing the burden on
school districts,200 and a national legislative correction has been
proposed.201 However, Schaffer remains the current general standard in
most jurisdictions.

(2007); Kelly D. Thomason, Note, The Costs of a “Free” Education: The Impact of
Schaffer v. Weast and Arlington v. Murphy on Litigation Under the IDEA, 57 DUKE
L.J. 457 (2007).
199. See Thomason, supra note 198, at 457 (arguing that the Court’s decisions in
Schaffer and Murphy disrupted a “prior trend in IDEA litigation . . . that had increased
the substantive and procedural rights of children with disabilities”).
200. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-76d-e(1) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 14, § 3140 (2011); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-8.02a(g) (2009); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18A:46-1.1 (West 2011); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(1)(c) (McKinney 2011); see
also Karger, supra note 198, at 208-15. Even though the New York Legislature
adopted the change recently in 2007, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg is
already trying to take advantage of budget cuts to convince the Governor and
Legislature to reverse the burden of proof statute. See Michael Bloomberg, Mayor,
New York City, N.Y., State Budget Testimony (Feb. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-free-country/2011/feb/07/transcript-bloombergs-statebudget-testimony/.
201. See, e.g., IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 1208, 112th Cong. (2011);
IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, S. 613, 112th Cong. (2011).
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L. The IDEA Should Require Parental Consent Prior to a District’s
Change in IEP, Placement, or FAPE
The IDEA currently requires informed parental consent prior to any
initial evaluation, reevaluation, and initial provision of special education
services.202 The IDEA allows states to determine whether to require
consent for any other activities, such as changes in IEP or placement.
Thus, the only way for most parents to stop a school district from making a
proposed change in classification, placement, IEP, or FAPE is to file for
due process, since such a parent has the right to insist that her child stays
put in the child’s last agreed upon placement.203 Given that the balance of
power, knowledge, and resources rests heavily with school districts, it
should not be up to a parent to file for due process when a district proposes
to make a change to a child’s last agreed upon educational program. For
families and young people without resources who do not have access to
counsel, this requirement is extremely burdensome. Although the student
outcomes speak for themselves as to whether more than 2,000 parents have
or should have a legitimate disagreement about the delivery of special
education services, it seems clear that many parents that could or should be
filing for due process are not doing so.
III. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE
POOR MUST CONTINUE
There are two principal paths to IDEA enforcement. The first is private
and lawyer-driven. Cases are filed before an administrative agency—and
possibly in court, on appeal—on behalf of individual students seeking
anything from a change in placement or tuition reimbursement to new or
more related services, independent assessment, or compensatory education
or services. Cases may also be filed on behalf of a class of students. The
most expensive and time consuming litigation is that filed in a trial court;
administrative complaints are another alternative. The second path to
enforcement is public, and considerably weaker. Its approach is largely
regulatory and investigative, conducted by state and federal bureaucrats,
with litigation by public attorneys remaining, at best, a theoretical final step
in the process.
One answer to equalizing options for unrich families is to give them
access to pro bono or prepaid private attorneys. While this may be the best

202. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (2006).
203. § 1415(j) (“[D]uring any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless
the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall
remain in the then-current educational placement of the child, or, if applying for initial
admission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the
public school program until all such proceedings have been completed.”).
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option, it is not a promising one, given the political climate and budget
deficits at all levels of government.204 Nevertheless, it is clear from the
discussion above that lawyers play a crucial role and are often the key to
unlocking obstacles to meaningful placement and services under IDEA.
How, then, can private litigation spur positive externalities205 for the benefit
of students whose families are unable to file due process complaints or
lawsuits?
A. More Attorneys Need to be Recruited Under the Existing Statutory
Scheme
The National Council on Disability (NCD) has long urged engaging
attorneys not traditionally associated with disability rights, such as those in
private bar associations and legal services.206 These lawyers should
represent almost exclusively clients without means to pay a retainer. As for
private bar involvement, the Illinois protection and advocacy agency,207 for
example, has had a particularly successful program training and retaining
members of the private bar to handle individual cases on a no-fee or fee
recovery basis,208 in addition to their own substantial caseloads. Offices
receiving Legal Services Corporation (LSC) funding are also well suited to
dedicate staff attorneys to representation of children from low-income
families on IDEA matters. These offices are accustomed to handling
administrative adjudications. Furthermore, of the many restrictions
Congress has placed on LSC civil practice areas over the years, individual
special education cases remain on the acceptable docket.209
204. Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1455 (2011) (offering a forthright, if
pessimistic, assessment of this option: “Given the antilawyer trend of the last few
reauthorizations, it is unlikely that a proposal to inject private advocates wholesale
would succeed. In addition, given concerns that special education budgets are draining
general education budgets, there is likely to be political resistance to the idea of
providing a personal advocate to children with disabilities, on top of all of the other
individualized extras that some feel these children are already receiving. This proposal
is not likely to gain any traction.”).
205. Id. at 1437-59 (defining positive externalities, transaction costs).
206. NCD REP. 2000, supra note 13.
207. Under 42 U.S.C. § 15043, each state and territory is required to establish a
“protection and advocacy” agency “of last resort” to advocate, at no cost, on behalf of
the human rights of persons with intellectual, developmental, mental health, physical,
sensory and other disabilities. § 15043. Most “P & As” have staff lawyers and/or lay
advocates who represent students and parents in an array of special education matters
ranging from IEP meetings to mediations and from due process hearings to court
appeals and class action litigation.
208. Staff attorneys train, mentor, and oversee cases handled by private counsel who
represent clients pro bono or recover fees from the school district if the parent and
student are the prevailing party. See Programs & Services, EQUIP FOR EQUALITY,
http://equipforequality.org/programs (last visited June 17, 2011).
209. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1610.4(d), 1612 et seq., 1620.3 (2011). Clients of legal services
offices must meet financial eligibility guidelines tied to U.S. poverty-level incomes. §
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An increasing number of law school clinics are devoting their caseloads
to child advocacy or to special education representation in particular.210
Most of these clinics are staffed by attorneys with prior practice
experience, although not necessarily in special education. The mediation
and due process cases are amenable to the clinical model of learning plus
service. With an ongoing and adequate supply of student participants, these
clinics are able to serve a larger number of clients.
B. Class Actions Should Continue, but Must be Outcome-Oriented and
Narrowly Focused
Class action lawsuits are a conventional tool used by public interest
lawyers for systemic reform of government institutions211 and school
systems, in particular.212 As with any class-wide injunctive order or
settlement, the benefit for an individual class member may be hard to
measure. With respect to delivery of special education, these cases rarely
result in a tailored program of instruction and services for an individual
low-income student. Nevertheless, it is possible to obtain some of the relief
that would enhance the educational outcomes of low-income youth and
eliminate obstacles in some of the areas discussed above, including
timeliness and adequacy of notice; timeliness of independent evaluations;
prior consent; emergency procedures; and due process for students in
disciplinary or truancy proceedings.
A number of district- or state-wide class actions have been litigated
under the IDEA, with mixed success.213 While it is beyond the scope of
1611.3.
210. See generally, Massey & Rosenbaum, supra note 149, at 295-325 (describing a
variety of clinical models and cases handled). A new advocacy textbook, with chapters
authored by current clinicians, has just been published: SPECIAL EDUCATION
ADVOCACY (Ruth Colker & Julie Waterstone eds., 2011).
211. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (ordering
statewide accommodations and modifications for disabled prison inmate); Knop v.
Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (requiring prison to provide inmates
with adequate winter clothing and access to lavatories); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (challenging treatment of persons with mental illness at
state hospital); see also Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on
Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA. L. REV. 443, 444 (2001) (citing cases).
212. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (remedying a school system’s
failure to provide English language instruction to non-English speaking students);
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990) (challenging statewide school finance
scheme); Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 14, 2000) (statewide
settlement to provide textbooks in K-12 schools and upgrade teacher qualifications and
school facilities); see also Charles Sabel & William Simon, Destabilization Rights:
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) (citing cases).
213. See, e.g., Corey H. v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F. Supp. 900, 918 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(finding Board of Education in violation of the IDEA); Beth V. ex rel. Yvonne V. v.
Carroll, 87 F.3d 80, 89 (3d Cir. 1996) (leaving open possibility of a right of action
under IDEA); Emma C. v. Eastin, No. C 96-4179 TEH, 2009 WL 482261 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 25, 2009) (providing history of settlement proceedings); N.J. Prot. & Advocacy,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2474200

HYMAN 10/13/11

148

12/8/201112:33:54 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:1

this Article to critique the effectiveness of those efforts and the orders and
settlements they produce, recent legal and policy analyses of some of the
major cases are instructive for future lawsuits that may be brought on
behalf of families without means.214
After serving as court monitor in a number of long-running class actions,
Education Professor and former OSEP Director Thomas Hehir posits that
lawyers need to be guided by five principles in class action litigation: know
the research and better educational practices; promote data-based
agreements; promote more litigation focused systematically on changing
practice; focus intervention; and join states as defendants.215
In a recent assessment of the role of courts in implementing IDEA,
professor and disability rights litigator Samuel Bagenstos concluded that in
fact, not much litigation has been filed under the IDEA,216 and direct court
intervention has made little direct difference in the treatment of students
with disabilities.217 Bagenstos does agree with commentators and critics
who claim there is an excessive focus on process over substance—at least
“at the margins.” 218 That said, school administrators are likely to correctly
implement court decisions when the decisions address broad, programmatic
questions with clear rules that can be followed by administrators.219
Nevertheless, Supreme Court jurisprudence has exacerbated problems
Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 563 F. Supp. 2d 474, 492 (D. N.J. 2008) (allowing claims
under the IDEA against Department of Education and Board of Education to progress
while denying claims against individual Board members); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub.
Schs., 519 F. Supp. 2d 870 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (declaring preference for mutual
agreement over litigation); Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15
(D.D.C. 2006) (reaffirming consent decree and noting a “hopeful moment” for the
children of District of Columbia); Smith v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 93-7044LEW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1996) (reaffirming consent decree); Jose P. v. Ambach, 557
F. Supp. 1230 (E.D.N.Y 1983) (discussing slow progress made by the city to enact
systems change).
214. See, e.g., Thomas Hehir, Looking Forward: Toward A New Role in Promoting
Educational Equity for Students with Disabilities from Low-Income Backgrounds, in
HANDBOOK OF EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH 831, 836-37 (Gary Sykes et al. eds.,
2009); Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29, at 126. See generally Pasachoff,
supra, note 204 (noting difficulties inherent in class actions).
215. Hehir, supra note 214, at 837-39. Professor Hehir also advocates more free
counsel for low-income families in due process hearings. Id. at 837. He believes this
“utopian” proposal could be accomplished by funding more protection and agency staff
to selectively represent clients with more significant disabilities in LRE cases. Id.
216. Fewer than one hundred class actions with IDEA claims have been certified
and these involve only one percent of the nation’s school districts. Bagenstos,
Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29 at 126. Not surprisingly, most of these cases are filed
in high income districts. See Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1426 (citing a 1999-2000
national study).
217. Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1414.
218. Compare Hehir, supra note 214, at 837 (finding that focus on procedural
elements leads to oversight and enforcement), with Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra
note 29 at 124-26.
219. Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29, at 124.
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experienced by poor children. We have already discussed the lack of
expert cost recovery due to Murphy220 and the burden of proof obstacles
posed by Schaffer.221 Three other Supreme Court cases discussed above,
Burlington, Carter, and Forest Grove, have opened the door for nonpublic
school tuition reimbursement. 222 While we noted the difficulties this
creates for families who cannot pay the tuition up front, we have not
addressed the fact that this placement, if and when obtained, has spawned a
two-tiered school system: those who can get a private school education at
public expense and those who cannot.223
The Supreme Court is also the author—or enabler—of the procedurallyoriented interpretation of IDEA, as first announced in Rowley.224 It is true
that the IDEA legislation was largely promoted by parent advocates who
crafted built-in protections for themselves and their children with
disabilities—in the form of the procedural safeguards discussed above.225
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court may have relied too heavily on the
IDEA’s procedural terms and the alleged “ardent advocacy” that would be
pursued by parents226 to the detriment of a substantive standard. Rowley
gives school districts a strong disincentive to focus on substance; hence,
administrators can follow well the rules on process.227 As noted above,
poor children and their families are not likely to advocate with ardor, and
they will be among those who fail when challenging a particular program
placement or related services.
Class action cases that result in mandating more process or greater
resource allocations for special education students do not necessarily
advance overall educational equity for the rich or unrich.228
220. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 76-79, 83-85 and accompanying text.
223. Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29, at 126. This underscores the
argument that there are no positive externalities that flow from one student’s filing for
due process where the student who prevails may exit the public schools in favor of a
private placement. See Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1435.
224. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 209 (1982).
225. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
226. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209 (recognizing the importance of parental
involvement in the planning of students’ educational programs and observing that
parents and guardians will “not lack ardor” in ensuring that their children receive all the
educational benefits to which they are entitled under IDEA); Rosenbaum, Aligning or
Maligning?, supra note 140, at 10.
227. Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29, at 124. Furthermore, as Rowley’s
more recent federal court progeny show deference to school administrators in
educational decision-making, those decisions are harder for parents to undo through
litigation. Id. at 125-26.
228. The long-running Jose P. v. Ambach litigation caused one writer to quip that
New York City’s regular education program resembles “a parking lot full of 1968 cars,
while special ed is like a handful of shiny Cadillacs.” Kay S. Hymnowitz, Special Ed:
Kids Go In, But They Don’t Come out, CITY J., Summer 1996, available at
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Notwithstanding the negative externalities for students without
disabilities—or other disabled students—who may be the by-product of
class litigation victories, experts agree that focused special education
litigation with outcome-based objectives is more successful than processoriented, broad-based “totality” litigation,229 even if the positive consent
decrees and injunctions owe more to lawyers’ strategic decisions than
anything inherent in IDEA.
C. Systemic Administrative Compliance Complaints are a Cost-Effective
and Delay-Reducing Tool
One underutilized vehicle for IDEA dispute resolution is the
administrative compliance complaint.230 Like a class action lawsuit, it is
lawyer-dependent, but can potentially bring broad-based relief without the
cost and delays of civil litigation. Its affordability and accessibility offer
more incentives for attorneys to challenge systemic processes that harm
low-income students and families as much as, or more than, special
education students in general.
Each state education agency (SEA) is required to have written
procedures that provide for the filing of a complaint against a school
district or local education agency (LEA), another public agency or against
the SEA, asserting violations of IDEA’s statutory or regulatory
mandates.231 Complaints can address both individual and systemic issues.
Like due process hearings, complaints can be used to resolve any matter
http://www.city-journal.org/html/6_3_special_ed.html. The irony of the auto metaphor
is that it was infamously used by one court to hold that under the IDEA, students are
entitled to a Chevy-like education, but not a Cadillac. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ.,
9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[The board of education] is not required to
provide a Cadillac [to a disabled pupil, but the] educational equivalent of a serviceable
Chevrolet.”). The argument has been made elsewhere that the line separating disabled
youngsters from those needing (non-disability) remediation or interventions is not a
bright one, and that perhaps all students should be entitled to the benefits and
protections afforded under the IDEA. See, e.g., Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Full Sp[]ed
Ahead: Expanding the IDEA to Let All Children Ride the Same Bus, 4 STAN. J. C.R &.
C.L. 373, 384-92 (2008).
229. Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29, at 130; see also, Hehir, supra note
214, at 838-39.
230. The Southern Disability Law Center and Southern Poverty Law Center through
the efforts of Attorneys Jim Comstock-Galagan and Ronald K. Lospennato are to be
credited with promoting the theory and practice of filing effective administrative
complaints. See S. DISABILITY LAW CTR., http://www.sdlcenter.org (last visited Sept.
3, 2011); S. POVERTY LAW CTR., http://www.splcenter.org (last visited Sept. 3, 2011).
231. 34 C.F.R. § 300.151 (2011). The violation must have occurred within one year
of the date the complaint is received, as compared to the two-year period for requesting
due process; states may allow for a longer period. Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick,
Director, Office of Special Educ. Programs, to Chief State School Officers, at 3 (July
17, 2000), available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20003/osep002071700safeguardssec.pdf; see also 71 Fed. Reg. 46,589, 46,601, 46,605
(Aug. 14, 2006).
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related to the identification, evaluation, educational placement, related
services or compensatory education of the child.232 Complaints also can be
used to resolve the provision of FAPE to the child, as well as any other
allegation that a public agency has violated IDEA provisions governing
assessment, program planning and outcomes and procedural safeguards.233
Just as in class litigation relief, a corrective action can lead to changes in
policies and procedures, additional or different services, compensatory
education, reimbursement, or the provision of future educational
services.234 Special masters, monitors, or consultants can conceivably be
appointed to oversee or assist with implementing a corrective action plan.
Parents may use the complaint procedures or due process to resolve any
disagreement with the school district. Issues in the complaint that are not
the subject of due process must be investigated by SEA within sixty
days.235
The complaint may be filed by anyone, including an organization, an
individual student, a protection and advocacy organization, an interested
community, or an out-of-state person.236 The SEA must issue written
decisions that address each allegation, including findings of fact and
conclusions and reasons for its decision.237 States are encouraged to offer
mediation prior to resolution, but it must be voluntary and the SEA must
bear the cost.238 The SEA must provide for “effective implementation” of
its final decision, including the provision of technical assistance,
negotiations, and corrective action necessary to achieve compliance.239
232. See Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 4; see also 71 Fed.
Reg. 46,601, 46,605.
233. See Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 4; see also 71 Fed.
Reg. 46,601, 46,605.
234. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151(b), 300.152(a)(5); 71 Fed. Reg. 46,602; see Letter from
William W. Knudsen, Acting Director, Office of Special Educ. Programs, to Dr. John
Copenhaver, Director, Mountain Plains Reg’l Res. Ctr. (Oct. 31, 2008), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20084/copenhaver103108correction-noncompliance4q2008.pdf
235. § 300.152(c); see Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 3-5; see
also 71 Fed. Reg. 46,604-05. The SEA has sixty calendar days from receipt to
complete an investigation—conducting an on-site investigation, if necessary. §
300.152(a). The complainant must be able to submit additional information, orally or
in writing and the public agency must be able to respond to complaint. Id.; see Letter
from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 8; see also 71 Fed. Reg. 46,602. The
timeline can be extended for exceptional circumstances (e.g., systemic complaint). §
300.152 (b). The complainant and LEA can agree to extend timeline for purposes of
mediation. Id.
236. See § 300.151(a)(1) (stating the agency must adopt procedures for “[r]esolving
any complaint, including a complaint filed by an organization or individual from
another State”).
237. § 300.152(a)(5).
238. § 300.152(b)(1)(ii); see Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 7;
see also 71 Fed. Reg. 46,603-04.
239. § 300.153(b)(2).
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The state agency may itself be the object of a compliance complaint, in
which case the SEA may contract with an independent third party for the
investigation and decision-rendering, while still complying with all
procedural and remediation steps.240 Although there is no guarantee that
the SEA will conduct the investigation with the intended vigor and rigor, its
failure to do so can be the basis of a second administrative complaint or
lawsuit, with a considerable evidentiary record already laid out. The failure
to conduct an adequate investigation, to devise an adequate remedy241 or to
investigate or remediate contrary to federal regulations242 have been the
subjects of successful litigation.
Compliance complaint remedies have included: (1) school- or districtwide positive behavior interventions, with training for all staff; (2)
improvements in transition services and vocational training programs; (3)
intensive reading and math remediation for students more than two years
behind their chronological grade level; (4) elimination of policies and
practices, such as a shortened school day, that result in students receiving
less services than they need; (5) strategies for moving students from more
restrictive to less restrictive placements; and (6) significant increase in the
frequency and duration of related services.243
This administrative procedure, when skillfully negotiated, can yield
systemic reforms, including those that target poor children and youth, in
such areas as failure to provide appropriate related services, failure to
develop behavioral intervention programs, failure to timely evaluate
students, inadequate levels of social work and counseling services, and lack
of mental health services. The negotiating will likely need attorney
expertise and a lot of chutzpah, but at a fraction of the time and cost of
class action litigation.244 Of course, this approach may need to be used
with complementary community organizing and media strategies and cocounseling with some of the established public interest law firms and

240. § 300.153(b)(1); see Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 9; see
also 71 Fed. Reg. 46,602-03.
241. See, e.g., Chavez v. Bd. of Educ, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1208 (D. N.M. 2009)
(recognizing that courts may require SEA to provide services directly to disabled
children when LEA has failed to do so); see also, Corey H. v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.
Supp. 900, 904-05 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that the SEA made no effort to take
corrective action with respect to district violations of LRE regulations).
242. See, e.g., Beth V. ex rel. Yvonne V. v. Carroll, 87 F.3d 80, 88 (3d Cir. 1996)
(alleging that the SEA consistently failed to investigate and timely resolve IDEA
complaints).
243. For sample systemic compliance complaints, responses, and settlements from
school districts in Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi see Case Docket, S. POVERTY
LAW CTR., http://splcenter.org/get-informed/case-docket/ (last visited June 17, 2011).
244. In particular, the standing is liberally construed and there is no need to pay
court costs, to certify a class, propound or respond to discovery, or engage in law and
motion practice. There may be expert or consultant costs, however.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2474200

HYMAN 10/13/11

2011]

12/8/201112:33:54 PM

HOW IDEA FAILS FAMILIES WITHOUT MEANS

153

private counsel.245
D. The U.S. Department of Education Has Authority to Aggressively
Monitor Districts and States
In her thoughtful analysis, relying in part on a market paradigm,
Professor Eloise Pasachoff writes:
In the absence of a viable private enforcement strategy for low-income
children, the question becomes whether the public enforcement system
can do better. It can. While there are theoretical concerns with public
enforcement in general, and practical concerns with public enforcement
of the IDEA as a historical matter, there is nonetheless a need for
government interventions that focus on low-income children; that have a
broad geographical reach; that avoid the need for individuals to raise
claims on their own behalf; that create positive externalities beyond the
scope of any particular intervention; and that incentivize the relevant
parties to provide appropriate special education services for low-income
children.246

Professor Pasachoff notes that the state complaint system attempts to
counter the problem of “externalities.”247 As discussed above, any time an
SEA resolves a complaint by finding a failure to provide appropriate
services, the written decision must address corrective action as to the
particular child as well as “appropriate future provision of services for all
children with disabilities.”248
In a sweeping departure from the existing law, Congress established a
detailed scheme in 2004 for monitoring compliance and enforcement.249
The centerpiece was “focused monitoring.”250 Its aim was to improve
“educational results and functional outcomes,” with particular attention to
providing FAPE in the least restrictive environment, transition services,
state supervision of complaint resolution, and overrepresentation of racial
and ethnic minorities through inappropriate policies and practices.251 In her
245. There are also disadvantages to this strategy, for example, almost certainly no
attorney fees. But see Lucht v. Molalla River Sch. Dist., 225 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir.
2000); Upper Valley Assoc. for Handicapped Citizens v. Mills, 928 F. Supp. 429 (D.
Vt. 1996). Moreover, there is less control by plaintiffs—and their lawyers—over the
process and school districts may file individual due process complaints to stay the
compliance investigation. Under 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c), the State must set aside a
complaint if due process is requested on the same issue. 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c)
(2006). Finally, the quality of state monitors and administrators cannot be
overestimated. If dissatisfied with results of the investigation, plaintiffs will most
likely still need to exhaust due process procedures.
246. Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1461.
247. Id. at 1440-41.
248. § 300.151(b)(2).
249. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1416-17 (2006).
250. Id.
251. §§ 1402, 1416(a)(3), (b).
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review, the Secretary of Education is supposed to rely primarily on student
performance on state assessments—including alternate assessments,
dropout rates and graduation rates, and local and state compliance plans
developed by the states.252
In theory, there is a complex scheme of graduated sanctions, based on
standards such as “lack of satisfactory progress” for two consecutive years,
“substantial noncompliance,” and “egregious noncompliance.” Early
stages of noncompliance typically result in corrective action plans. When a
school district fails to correct, additional actions are available, for example,
fund recovery, withholding funds, and suspension of payments and referral
to the Department of Justice (DOJ).253 In practice, the monitoring and
enforcement have proven to be weak and disappointing. With the proper
bureaucratic initiative, this mechanism has potential to directly or indirectly
target districts with high levels of students from poor families.
The National Council on Disability (NCD) addressed the subject of
oversight extensively in one of its special education reports. The 2004
reauthorization offered a more explicit means of enforcement than the 1997
IDEA amendments. The Department of Education’s previous practice of
placing “special conditions” on new state grants had been criticized as
politicizing.254 While seemingly limited to certain performance indicators,
the new provisions have the potential to remedy some of the NCD
criticisms about lack of focus and unclear standards for determining
whether noncompliance is systemic, particularly in low-income districts.
The NCD also recommended more collaboration between the parent
training centers and the protection and advocacy agencies in developing a
statewide special education advocacy strategy.255 The strength and vitality
of publicly funded—but nongovernmental—actors can be more easily
predicted and controlled for securing broad-based IDEA compliance than
that of public sector officials and their political overseers whose job might
be to accomplish the very same thing.
E. The Department of Education Can Collect and Disclose Data
We have discussed the problems poor families face in obtaining
adequate and comprehensible information about special education
processes. These kinds of “informational asymmetries” among parents and
between parents and schools, as well as imperfect overall information about
types of services that might be available and useful, warrant reliance on

252.
253.
254.
255.

§ 1416(b).
§ 1416(e).
NCD REP. 2000, supra note 13 at 35, 37.
Id. at 71.
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public enforcement and implementation mechanisms.256
The United States Department of Education, as noted earlier, does
collect special education data on such things as racial disproportionality,
state implementation of IDEA, and student dropouts.257 The Department is
also required to annually collect data from SEAs concerning the number
and percentage of disabled students (by race, ethnicity, limited English
proficiency status, gender, and disability category) who are: receiving
FAPE, participating in regular and separate classes, being disciplined, have
completed or terminated special education services, and have filed for a
due process hearing, among other remedies.258
While useful for planning and some forms of monitoring and
enforcement, there is no data that directly focuses on the needs of children
from families without means, and there is no explicit mandate to
disseminate this information. If the information disclosure requirement is to
be expanded, we must also ensure that parents are sufficiently informed
about their rights and services options through agents who are independent
of the federal, state, and local educational bureaucracies. If ardent
advocacy is to be the norm for all parents, irrespective of socio-economic
class, it will require creative and community-based outreach strategies and
the distribution of many “advo-kits.”259
IV. LEGISLATIVE AGENDA FOR CONGRESS
The following proposals all follow from the above discussion of the
plight of families without the means to negotiate special education
processes. Most of these are obvious to education advocates and
policymakers. What is chiefly lacking at the present time is political will,
immobilized by both ideology and budgetary constraints. Although even
modest federal legislation260 can be a target for fiscal slings or political
arrows, we are compelled to record the following legislative objectives for
future consideration.

256. Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1439.
257. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
258. § 1418(a)(1)(A); see Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments
of 1997, Pub. L. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37, 101-02 (1997); see also Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-446, § 101, 118 Stat.
2647, 2738-40 (2004).
259. See Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning?, supra note 140, at 10 (noting that
when the IDEA was last considered for reauthorization, a group of San Francisco Bay
Area lawyers and self-help providers suggested, only half in jest, that parents be
furnished “advo-kits” as part of a massive grassroots educational campaign).
260. Many of the same political and budgetary factors are also at play at the state
and local governmental levels. However, there may be opportunities for some of these
legislative initiatives to be considered by state legislatures and boards of education.
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A. Clarify That Prospective Funding for Tuition and Services is Available
as a Self-Help Remedy
It is important for Congress to clarify that the remedy of private school
tuition in the absence of FAPE is not a remedy only available for wealthy
families. The statute and regulations should clarify that both prospective
tuition funding and satisfaction of a debt—or retroactive direct payment to
a school—are valid remedies. Further, the IDEA should be amended to
include that private funding for services, and not just private school tuition,
is appropriate where FAPE has been denied.
B. Expand IEE Provisions to Improve Access for Families
Congress should consider expanding the right of an IEE to parents and
students who have not been timely evaluated or have been denied an
evaluation, or where there has been a “child find” violation, which has
forced the parents to seek an IEE.
Further, the IDEA should be clarified to avoid a narrow interpretation of
the concept of “evaluation.” If a district conducts an evaluation but fails to
include an assessment in one particular area that would be obviously
required in any particular case, such as speech and language or assistive
technology, a parent should have the right to an IEE.
C. Incorporate the Compensatory Education Remedy into the Statute
An amendment to incorporate the remedy of compensatory education for
a denial of FAPE into the statute is extremely important to ensure that the
rights of children without financial resources are protected. As it stands
now, most parents whose children are being denied FAPE do not realize
they have any remedy. Including compensatory education in the statute
would not only address this problem, but would ensure equity across the
states.
D. Create Emergency and Interim Hearing Procedures
As noted above, the IDEA’s due process procedures are supposed to
function in an environment that is in compliance with the statute.
However, the reality is different. Thus, emergencies outside of the
disciplinary context frequently arise, for example, unenforced IEPs, the
need for an IEE, and the right to prospective tuition funding. These
situations cannot be addressed effectively through the current due process
system.
E. Strengthen the Notice and Safeguard Provisions
The IDEA should be amended to ensure that the notice and safeguard
provisions actually serve to protect the rights of parents with limited
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literacy or English language abilities and allow them to participate in the
process. Toward that end, the IDEA should include a provision granting
parents the right to receive educational records translated into their own
language and making these records accessible to parents who lack
sufficient literacy skills. Further, the IDEA should be amended to require
districts to provide a written description of the special education process in
addition to procedural safeguards. Moreover, the regulations should be
amended to expressly prohibit boilerplate language for notices.
F. Expand and Clarify Students’ Rights
The topic of students’ rights and the IDEA, is an extensive one that goes
beyond the scope of this Article. The IDEA’s provisions concerning
transfer of rights, notices, and safeguards for youth ages sixteen to twentyone should be completely revisited in light of the realities of student
outcomes. At a minimum, the IDEA should be amended to ensure that
regardless of transfer of rights, both parents and students over sixteen
should receive annual notices of rights and safeguards.
G. Expand Disciplinary Protections, Right to FAPE and Services to
Expressly Include Truant Students
Adoption of specific provisions concerning truancy and absenteeism are
critical to ensuring more effective outcomes for students with disabilities.
The IDEA and its regulations should be amended to clarify that truant
students, like those who are suspended, are still entitled to FAPE.
Additionally, the law should be clarified to expressly indicate that truancy
or absenteeism that interferes with learning is both a “lack of progress” that
must be addressed as part of an annual review or that may trigger a review,
and is also a “behavior” justifying a functional behavior assessment and
positive behavioral supports. Further, truant students should have the same
procedural requirements as those subject to discipline. The IDEA should
also be clarified to prohibit schools from using family courts to address
truancy, since those issues should be addressed under the IDEA.
H. Reinstate the Right to Expert Witness Fees for Prevailing Parties
Organizations representing families of children with disabilities are
currently working to correct the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy.261
Congress and state legislatures have addressed the Court’s decisions

261. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS & ADVOCATES, INC., AN
INCREASINGLY UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND IDEA 2004
CONCERNS
(2007),
available
at
http://www.copaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/04/Leveling-Playing-Field_Bullets_112807.pdf.
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individually.262
I. Shift the Burden of Meeting IDEA Requirements to School Districts and
Require Informed Consent for a Change in IEP, Placement, or FAPE
As discussed, it is extremely difficult for families without financial
resources to bear the burden of proof of the IDEA’s requirements, obtain
attorneys, IEEs, expert witnesses, or generate a track record of success in a
private placement. It makes sense that a student’s family must prove that
any private services they seek are appropriate if those services have not
been previously agreed to by the IEP team. However, it seems inconsistent
with the intent of the due process provisions to place on parents the burden
of proving non-compliance with the statute, particularly when the evidence
of compliance is within full control of the district and discovery is rarely
permitted.
Further, allowing school districts to change IEPs and placements unless
parents invoke due process has a disproportionate impact on families who
cannot afford lawyers, or who do not understand and cannot navigate the
system, and whose children are at greater risk of educational segregation,
discipline and dropping out. Requiring parental consent for nondisciplinary IEP and placement changes would be a critical step in
balancing the power between districts and unrich families. As noted, some
states have already adopted statutes placing the burden of proof on the
school district.263 Federal legislation should be enacted to do the same for
all students across the nation.
J. Reinstate the Catalyst Theory for Attorney’s Fees
The Buckhannon holding264 must be reversed by Congress, allowing
litigants to shift attorney’s fees to defendants, including school districts
who are parties to settlements that lack a court’s imprimatur.
K. Increase the Number of Publicly Funded Attorneys
When the IDEA was last amended, the Senate bill contained language
designed to ensure that states spend funds to support the state protection
and advocacy systems in advising and assisting parents in the areas of
262. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text. A bill to amend the IDEA to
permit a prevailing party to recover expert fees has been introduced twice in the House
of Representatives, IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 2740, 111th Cong. § 2
(2009); IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 4188, 110th Cong. 2d Sess. (2007), and
there is currently a bill before the House of Representatives, IDEA Fairness Restoration
Act, H.R. 1208, 112th Cong. (2011), and before the Senate, IDEA Fairness Restoration
Act, S. 613, 112th Cong. (2011).
263. See supra note 188.
264. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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dispute resolution,265 which arguably could include training on procedural
safeguards involving notice, consent, assessment, rights to particular
services, and placement.
A more ambitious technical assistance and self-advocacy scheme was
recommended by the NCD in its major review of IDEA.266 It called for the
Department of Education to fund more lawyers to counsel clients, a
national back-up center, and self-advocacy training programs for students
with disabilities and their parents.267 The NCD found that the programs
and services in most states were inadequate and called for funding a lawyer
at every parent training center,268 a protection and advocacy agency, and an
independent living center “to provide competent legal advice . . . .”269
M. Conduct More Aggressive Investigations and Justice Department
Litigation
The NCD has long lamented the lack of a federal complaint system,
which distinguishes IDEA from every other U.S. civil rights law.270
Furthermore, the NCD found that under the current system, parents and
other stakeholders were not adequately involved in the Department of
Education’s on-site investigations or monitoring.271
The Department of Education should not be the sole enforcement
265. S. 1248, 108th Cong. § 611(e)(2)(B) (2003). This would have provided the
protection and advocacy agencies (P&As) with additional resources targeted
specifically to handle the IDEA issues. See id. The P&As also publish a number of
self-help special education materials. See generally DISABILITY RIGHTS CAL. &
COMMUNITY ALLIANCE ON SPECIAL EDUCATION, SPECIAL EDUCATION RIGHTS &
RESPONSIBILITIES
(rev.
2011),
available
at
http://www.disabilityrightsca.org/pubs/504001.pdf.
266. NCD REP. 2000, supra note 13.
267. Id.; see also Monica Costello, Note, Systemic Compliance Complaints: Making
IDEA’s Enforcement Provisions a Reality, 41 U. MICH. L. REFORM 507, 523 (2008);
Phillips, supra note 35, at 1842-52; Wakelin, supra note 32, at 283.
268. See NCD REP. 2000, supra note 13; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1482-84 (2006).
“Parent training and information centers” are funded, in part, to meet the particular
training and information needs of underserved parents and to assist them in
understanding the availability of, and how to effectively use, procedural safeguards
under IDEA, including alternative methods of dispute resolution. § 1482(b). Similarly
“community parent resource centers” were created to give training and information to
the “underserved parents of children with disabilities,” including those who are lowincome, have limited English proficiency or are themselves disabled. § 1483(a).
Clients of legal services offices must meet financial eligibility guidelines. 45 C.F.R.
§1611.1 et seq. (2011).
269. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO SCHOOL ON CIVIL RIGHTS (2000),
available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2000/Jan252000. In 2000, the the
National Council on Disability called for the establishment and funding of a protection
and advocacy system specific to IDEA to be administered through the Department of
Education. Id. at recommendation VII.7; see also Hehir, supra note 214, at 837 (calling
for strategic litigation by P&A attorneys.
270. NCD REP. 2000, supra note 13, at 35, 37.
271. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2474200

HYMAN 10/13/11

160

12/8/201112:33:54 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:1

agency. The Department of Education has longstanding and collaborative
relationships with state education administrators. This is an important
relationship that is jeopardized when the Department of Education
threatens sanctions. Partial solutions were included in the last
reauthorization when enforcement authority was also given to the DOJ, but
only following referral of cases from the Department of Education. “This
has not worked for there have been no referrals to DOJ since that authority
was added to the IDEA.”272 In 2002, the NCD recommended an expansive
role for DOJ: “Congress should authorize and fund the [DOJ] to
independently investigate and litigate IDEA cases, as well as administer a
federal system for handling pattern and practice complaints filed by
This is consistent with the nation’s approach to
individuals.”273
discrimination in housing and employment, and would surely give leverage
to students from poor families.274 The NCD also recommends adequate
funding for enforcement, complaint handling, and technical assistance
infrastructures, enabling the DOJ and Department of Education to support
improvements in state compliance and ensure better outcomes for
children.275
The Fordham Foundation/Progressive Policy Institute also made
recommendations in a report containing a detailed critique of the
Department of Education status quo.276 The report charged that the
traditional compliance-based model, with the 1997 amendments’ new
regime of results-based accountability, was “merely grafted” onto the preexisting approach.277
Monitoring is not only key to equalizing the leverage of parents without
financial means, but “[s]trong monitoring and enforcement provisions are
key to keeping states and school districts out of court.” 278
272. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION
ACT REAUTHORIZATION: WHERE DO WE REALLY STAND? (2002) [hereinafter NCD
REP. 2002], available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2002/July52002.
273. NCD REP. 2002, supra note 273.
274. See Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1422.
275. NCD REP. 2002, supra note 273, at recommendation 2.
276. Bryan C. Hassel & Patrick J. Wolf, Effectiveness and Accountability (Part 2):
Alternatives to the Compliance Model, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW
CENTURY, 309 (Chester E. Finn, Jr., et al. eds., 2001), available at
http://www.dlc.org/documents/SpecialEd_ch14.pdf.
277. Id. One of the more modest compliance alternatives recommended is “smart
regulation.” Id. at 311. While regulators can still verify that parties are following basic
norms of behavior and impose sanctions where necessary under this alternative, they
may “deploy a broader range of tools” that have a free market tinge. Id. at 311-12.
This might include, “forging voluntary agreements; . . . using information to spur good
behavior; addressing underlying causes of noncompliance; and replacing procedural
controls with after-the-fact checks.” Id. at 312-17.
278. H.R. Rep. No. 108-77, at 380 (2003). The House Minority recognized this
when considering H.R. 1350, the last IDEA reauthorization bill: “We know that few, if
any, states and school districts deliberately flout IDEA. Unfortunately, often the only
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N. More Data Disclosures May be Useful
A truly modest, but less costly proposal is to mandate more data
collection—and dissemination—by the Department of Education, with an
emphasis on factors that will help pinpoint the gaps in the specialized
education of students from families without means. According to
regulatory policy theory, “[m]andating disclosure can be both less
expensive and more efficient than command-and-control mechanisms, by
giving people the information they need to make decisions rather than by
requiring particular means or ends.”279 As discussed above, this will only
be successful when the data is artfully exposed by organizations and
advocates who can use it for the betterment of their clients.
O. Congressional Mandates Affecting Children from Poor Families Should
Be Linked to Federal Expenditures
A final tool in the legislative toolbox is the congressional spending
clause authority. Congress can impose more conditions on the states in
exchange for providing IDEA funding, viz. improvement of services to
poor children. The Department of Education’s Office of Special Education
Programs has the authority to target the funds it wishes to withhold from
LEAs that are not compliant, rather than withholding funds from the state
as a whole.280 Congress could mandate that a state providing (or permitting
its districts to provide) worse special education services to poor children
than to wealthier children would not be in compliance with the law, and the
federal government could therefore withhold funding.281
CONCLUSION
This Article has canvassed pressing issues of educational and social
equity. Without diminishing the gains that the IDEA has generated for
students with disabilities, a new phase in this perennially passionate civil
and human rights struggle must soon be faced. The chief goal of this
Article’s sketch of the salient issues, ones that will be confronted by
way a school district’s lack of compliance is discovered is when a parent pursues
litigation.” Id.
279. Pasachoff, supra note 204 at 1465 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Informational
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 613,
624 (1999)).
280. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e)(6) (2006); see also Thomas Hehir, IDEA and
Disproportionality: Federal Enforcement, Effective Advocacy, and Strategies for
Change, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 219, 229 (Daniel J. Losen & Gary
Orfield eds., 2002).
281. For a detailed explanation of this proposal see Pasachoff, supra note 204, at
1474-75. The mandate could either “require the same degree of excellence in special
education services in every district around the state” or “provide a weaker mandate,
requiring only that individual districts would not be permitted to provide better services
to wealthier children than to poor children.” Id. at 1486.
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parents, advocates, legislatures, policy-makers, and, inevitably, the courts,
is to move the discourse forward. We have presented several options, a
number of which depend on legislative will, a better fiscal climate, or both.
Ameliorating the disparities that currently exist will require strategic
thinking, sustained advocacy, and a fearless commitment to equal
educational opportunity.
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